Knowing your own mind

Dialogue 42 (4):791-798 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. What exercises philosophers is the fact that people seem to produce these descriptions of their own mental lives without any pretence of considering evidence or reasons of any kind and yet these descriptions are treated by the rest of us as authoritative, at least in a wide range of cases. How can this be?

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The myth of the mind.William W. Tait - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):65-74.
Knowing me, knowing you: Theory of mind and the machinery of introspection.Philip Robbins - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):129-143.
Knowing what it is like and knowing how.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. pp. 55--119.
On Knowing One's Own Language.Barry C. Smith - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 391--428.
Is knowledge the most general factive stative attitude?Cesare Cozzo - 2011 - In Carlo Cellucci, Emiliano Ippoliti & Emily Grosholz (eds.), Logic and Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 84-88.
Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Being in two minds: The divided mind in the ny yas tras.Joerg Tuske - 1999 - Asian Philosophy 9 (3):229 – 238.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
107 (#160,779)

6 months
7 (#411,886)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Owens
King's College London

Citations of this work

Moran on agency and self-knowledge.Lucy O'Brien - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):391-401.
Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access?Timothy Allen & Joshua May - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):617-629.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
Weakness of will.Frank Jackson - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):1-18.

Add more references