Listening to algorithms: The case of self‐knowledge

European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper begins with the thought that there is something out of place about offloading inquiry into one's own mind to AI. The paper's primary goal is to articulate the unease felt when considering cases of doing so. It draws a parallel between the use of algorithms in the criminal law: in both cases one feels entitled to be treated as an exception to a verdict made on the basis of a certain kind of evidence. Then it identifies an account of first‐person authority that can make good on this: agentialism. Thus, the paper constitutes an argument in favor of an agentialist treatment of self‐knowledge and first‐person authority.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):432-452.
First persons: On Richard Moran's authority and estrangement.Taylor Carman - 2003 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):395 – 408.
Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
First‐Person Authority.William Child - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 533–549.
Elusive reasons: A problem for first-person authority.Krista Lawlor - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
Habituation and first-person authority.Jonathan Webber - 2015 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-01-11

Downloads
93 (#226,828)

6 months
24 (#129,819)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Understanding from Machine Learning Models.Emily Sullivan - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):109-133.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.

View all 35 references / Add more references