Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066 (2019)

Joshua DiPaolo
California State University, Fullerton
The Fallibility Norm—the claim that we ought to take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs—appears to conflict with several other compelling epistemic norms. To shed light on these apparent conflicts, I distinguish two kinds of norms: norms of perfection and norms of compensation. Roughly, norms of perfection tell us how agents ought to behave if they’re to be perfect; norms of compensation tell us how imperfect agents ought to behave in order to compensate for their imperfections. I argue that the Fallibility Norm is a norm of compensation, and that thinking of it like this helps us make progress in debates surrounding disagreement, higher-order evidence, and coherence.
Keywords Higher-Order Evidence  Evidentialist Dictum  Probabilism  Theory of the Second Best  Nonideal Epistemology  Disagreement  Epistemic Modesty
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1110-y
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Was It Polarization or Propaganda? [REVIEW]C. Thi Nguyen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:173-191.

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