Episteme 16 (1):39-55 (2019)

Authors
Joshua DiPaolo
California State University, Fullerton
Abstract
The “Evidentialist Dictum” says we must believe what our evidence supports, and the “Fallibility Norm” says we must take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs. This paper presents a problem for the Evidentialist Dictum based in the Fallibility Norm and a particular conception of evidential support. It then addresses two novel Evidentialist responses to this problem. The first response solves the problem by claiming that fallibility information causes “evidence-loss.” In addition to solving the problem, this response appears to explain what’s wrong with certain illegitimate dismissals of misleading evidence. However, this explanation opens it up to objections. Next, I consider and pose challenges to an Evidentialist strategy that attempts to solve the problem by converting accounts of fallibility’s epistemic significance for rational belief into principles of evidential support. I conclude by sketching a solution that allows us to capture what’s true in the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm.
Keywords Evidentialism  Fallibility  Higher-Order Evidence  Evidence Loss
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2017.17
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References found in this work BETA

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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.

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Citations of this work BETA

Second Best Epistemology: Fallibility and Normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.

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