7 found
See also
Arianna Falbo
Bentley University
  1. Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.
    A puzzle arises when combining two individually plausible, yet jointly incompatible, norms of inquiry. On the one hand, it seems that one shouldn’t inquire into a question while believing an answer to that question. But, on the other hand, it seems rational to inquire into a question while believing its answer, if one is seeking confirmation. Millson (2021), who has recently identified this puzzle, suggests a possible solution, though he notes that it comes with significant costs. I offer an alternative (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  2. Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Much of the recent work on epistemology of inquiry defends two related theses. First, inquiry into a question rationally prohibits believing an answer to that question. Second, knowledge is the aim of inquiry. I develop a series of cases which indicate that inquiry is not as narrow as these views suggest. These cases can be accommodated if we take a broader approach and understand inquiry as aiming at epistemic improvement, described more generally. This approach captures a wider range of inquiring (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3. Slurs, Neutral Counterparts, and What You Could Have Said.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):359-375.
  4. Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness.Arianna Falbo - 2022 - Hypatia 37 (2):343-363.
    This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experience, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn’t result from a lack (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  70
    Analyzing the Wrongfulness of Lying: A Defence of Pluralism.Arianna Falbo - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):431-454.
    Les explications de ce pourquoi mentir est mal sont toutes inadéquates. Leur problème commun se situe dans leur structure unitaire. Ces analyses présupposent que tous les mensonges sont mauvais pour la même raison unificatrice. Cette supposition ne rend cependant pas justice au phénomène du mensonge, et ce, parce qu’on peut s’objecter à l’acte de mentir de différentes façons. Ainsi je suggère qu’il faut un changement dialectique en direction d’un traitement pluraliste de ce qui est mauvais dans le mensonge. Il ne (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Outsiders Within: Reflections on Being a First-Generation and/or Low-Income Philosopher.Arianna Falbo & Heather Stewart - 2021 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 3 (20):1-6.
  7. Spitting Out the Kool-Aid: A Review of Kate Manne’s Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. [REVIEW]Arianna Falbo - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7:12-17.