Abstract

Analogy is not a method of logical reasoning but a method of conjecture. This is because the conclusion of logical reasoning in its true sense must be drawn inevitably from its premise through a certain logical process. But analogy does not have this characteristic. Therefore, in the sense of modern logic, analogy is generally not recognized as a logical method. It was in this sense that Einstein stressed that from experiential facts to theory there was no passage for logic. Of course, he could not deny the role played by analogy in scientific recognition; on the contrary, he attached great importance to this role. The problem is in the idea that analogy is not a "passage for logic." As early as thirty years ago, the well-known contemporary American logician Tarski emphatically pointed out the difference between logic and empirico-scientific methods and at that time tended to doubt the possibility of the existence of any "logic of empirical science," which is opposed to "logic of deductive science." But up to the present, a number of logic textbooks and articles published in China today still often comprehend the concept "logic" extensively and usually look upon the method of analogy as a method of logical reasoning