Cartesian Self-Consciousness Revisited

Abstract

When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is that you’ve got some immediate, noninferential apprehension of your being joyful, such as this noninferential apprehension is analogous to sense perception, and unlike sense perception, it makes it unquestionable or evident to you that you presently are in a joyful mood. In this paper, I defend this view against some classical objections, arguing that pre-reflective self-consciousness actually is analogous to sense perception

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,672

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Bewusstsein bei Descartes.Christian Barth - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):162-194.
Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption.Gregg Caruso - 2005 - In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Consciousness as internal monitoring.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism.Bruce Mangan - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):1-17.
Consciousness, subjectivity and physicalism.Xiangdong Xu - 2004 - Philosophical Inquiry 26 (1-2):21-39.
A Defense of Cartesian Materialism.Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939-963.
The Maximality of Cartesian Categories.Z. Petric & K. Dosen - 2001 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 47 (1):137-144.
Shades of consciousness.Roderic A. Girle - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (2):143-57.
An introduction to reflective seeing.Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):235-56.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-20

Downloads
11 (#1,132,782)

6 months
1 (#1,462,504)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Arnaud Dewalque
University of Liège

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references