Consciousness as internal monitoring

Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14 (1995)
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Abstract

Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses

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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Unfelt pain.Kevin Reuter & Justin Sytsma - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1777-1801.
Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.

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