Naïve realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar
Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1897-1910 (2016)
Abstract
In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1
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