Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253 (2014)

Authors
Boyd Millar
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) cannot. I argue that this claim is false. Specifically, I maintain that the only acceptable naïve realist account of the relevant phenomenology is circular and that the content view can provide a similar account. In addition, I maintain that a certain specific variety of the content view provides a non-circular and thus more satisfactory account of this phenomenology. If so, then contrary to what is commonly assumed there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism
Keywords Perception  Phenomenology  Perceptual content  Naive realism  Content view
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0210-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

What’s so Naïve About Naïve Realism?Carlo Raineri - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3637-3657.
Consciousness and the Limits of Memory.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5217-5243.
Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds.Neil Mehta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):197-218.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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