Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736 (2012)

Authors
Matthew David Conduct
Durham University
Abstract
I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented. I will defend a view according to which in non-perceptual experience one is presented with mere universals, while in perceptual experience one is presented with the instantiation of a universal by a particular. This is to adopt disjunctivism about the objects of experience, about that which is apparently present in experience
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.009
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References found in this work BETA

Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Perception and its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.
The Obscure Object of Hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Response to Montague.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):740-741.

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