Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase

Mind 126 (502):529-578 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The resultant view is middle way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant, holding that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding.

Similar books and articles

Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.
Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
A Nonrepresentational Approach to Perception.Jason Leddington - 2011 - In Georg Bertram, Robin Celikates, Christophe Laudou & David Lauer (eds.), Expérience et Réflexivité. L'Harmattan. pp. 45-54.
Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
Perceptual presence.Jason Leddington - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
The Causal Argument against Disjunctivism.Michael Sollberger - 2007 - Facta Philosophica 9 (1):245-267.
Naive realism and experiential evidence.Matthew Kennedy - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109.


Added to PP

1,295 (#9,399)

6 months
180 (#17,479)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anil Gomes
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
The Value of Perception.Keith Allen - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):633-656.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.

View all 126 references / Add more references