What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):198-207 (2018)
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Abstract

_ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 198 - 207 The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_.

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Citations of this work

Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis.Annalisa Coliva - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (5):914-934.
The Point of Moore's Proof.Charles Raff - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.
Replies to Coliva, Leite, and Stroud.Penelope Maddy - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):231-244.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..

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