Cody Gilmore
University of California, Davis
David Lewis defends the following "non-circular definition of personhood": "something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate." I give a counterexample, involving a person who is a part of another, much larger person, with a separate mental life. I then offer an easy repair, which preserves the virtues of Lewis's definition without introducing any new vices.
Keywords fission  maximality  mereology  maximal properties  stages  personal identity  David Lewis  temporal parts
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.232
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Parts of Classes.David Lewis - 1990 - Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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