Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):54-60 (2017)
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| Abstract |
David Lewis defends the following "non-circular definition of personhood": "something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate." I give a counterexample, involving a person who is a part of another, much larger person, with a separate mental life. I then offer an easy repair, which preserves the virtues of Lewis's definition without introducing any new vices.
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| Keywords | fission maximality mereology maximal properties stages personal identity David Lewis temporal parts |
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| DOI | 10.1002/tht3.232 |
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References found in this work BETA
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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