Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453 (1996)

Authors
Theodore Sider
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts.1 Others accept “three dimensionalism”, rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons “endure”, or are “wholly present” throughout their lives.2 I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not only do I accept person stages; I claim that we are stages.3 Likewise for other objects of our everyday ontology: statues are statue-stages, coins are coin-stages, etc. At one level, I accept the ontology of the worm view. I believe in spacetime worms, since I believe in temporal parts and aggregates of things I believe in. I..
Keywords Persistence
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DOI 10.1080/00048409612347421
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shared Modes of Presentation.Simon Prosser - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):465-482.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Fragmentalist Presentist Perdurantism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):693-703.
Multiple Actualities and Ontically Vague Identity.Robert Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.

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