Results for 'temporal parts'

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  1.  10
    Leibniz on mathematics and the actually infinite division of matter, Samuel Levey.Temporal Parts Unmotivated - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2).
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  2. Temporal Parts and Superluminal Motion.Yuri Balashov - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (1):1-13.
    Hud Hudson has recently suggested a scenario intended to show that, assuming the doctrine of temporal parts and a sufficiently liberal view of composition, there are material objects that move faster than light. I accept Hudson's conditional but contend that his modus ponens is less plausible that the corresponding modus tollens. Reversed in this way, the argument stemming from the scenario raises the cost of mereological liberalism and advances the case for a principled restriction on diachronic composition.
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  3. Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
    Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.
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  4. Temporal parts of four dimensional objects.Mark Heller - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334.
    I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts.
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  5.  8
    Temporal Part Theory, Material Constitution and the Self.Lee Yungwhan - 2022 - Modern Philosophy 20:425-454.
    이 논문은 데이빗 루이스의 시간적 부분 이론(temporal part theory)과 물질적 구성(material consitution)에 대한 반 인와겐의 입장에 대한 논의를 출발점으로 삼는다. 먼저 필자는 루이스의 시간적 부분이론을 반박한다. 루이스의 이론의 핵심적인 내용을 똑같이 반영(mirror)하면서도 그 이론과 상충하는 이론을 구성하고 이 두 이론 중 어느 한 쪽을 선택하는 것은 결국은 임의적인(arbitrary) 결정을 하는 것인데 이 사실은 이 두 이론 모두를 매력적이지 않게 만든다고 주장한다. 이 두 이론을 모두 거부한다면 우리는 사물을 (특별히 문제되는 사물이 ‘자아’라면 더더욱) 어디에 위치시켜야 하는지 새로운 가능성을 탐색해 보게 (...)
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  6. Temporal Parts And Temporary Intrinsics.Andrew Botterell - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):5-23.
    In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the (...)
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  7. Temporal parts.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.
    This article discusses recent work in metaphysics on temporal parts. After a short introduction introducing the notion of a temporal part, we examine several well‐known arguments for the view that ordinary material objects such as tables, trees, and persons have temporal parts: (1) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve puzzles of coincidence (e.g., the statue/lump puzzle); (2) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve the problem of intrinsic change (...)
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  8. Temporal Parts.Theodore Sider - 2007 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 241--262.
    An introduction to temporal parts theory. Most of us believe in spatial parts: hands are spatial parts of people, an electron is a spatial part of a hydrogen atom, the earth is a spatial part of the solar system. Why are these parts "spatial" parts? Because they are spatially smaller: the hand is spatially smaller than the person, the electron is spatially smaller than the atom, the earth is spatially smaller than the solar system. (...)
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  9. Temporal parts unmotivated.Michael C. Rea - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.
    In debate about the nature of persistence over time, the view that material objects endure has played the role of "champion" and the view that they perdure has played the role of the "challenger." It has fallen to the perdurantists rather than the endurantists to motivate their view, to provide reasons for accepting it that override whatever initial presumption there is against it. Perdurantists have sought to discharge their burden in several ways. For example, perdurantism has been recommend on the (...)
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  10. Temporal parts and timeless parthood.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):738–752.
    What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts--fourdimensionalism--unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures (...)
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  11. Temporal parts and their individuation.J. Copeland, H. Dyke & D. Proudfoot - 2002 - Analysis 61 (4):289-292.
    Ignoring the temporal dimension, an object such as a railway tunnel or a human body is a three-dimensional whole composed of three-dimensional parts. The four-dimensionalist holds that a physical object exhibiting identity across time—Descartes, for example—is a four-dimensional whole composed of 'briefer' four-dimensional objects, its temporal parts. Peter van Inwagen (1990) has argued that four-dimensionalism cannot be sustained, or at best can be sustained only by a counterpart theorist. We argue that different schemes of individuation of (...)
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  12.  14
    Instantaneous Temporal Parts and Time Travel.Seahwa Kim & Takeshi Sakon - 2017 - Korean Journal of Logic 20 (1).
    The standard definition of an instantaneous temporal part cannot properly deal with cases involving time travel. This paper provides a new definition of an instantaneous temporal part by appealing to David Lewis's distinction between external time and personal time. The new definition avoids the problems because it does not allow more than one instantaneous temporal part of an object at each moment of its personal time. We argue that this new definition, combined with our new perdurantist semantic (...)
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  13. Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):265 – 288.
  14. Temporal parts and bundle theory.Douglas Ehring - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):163 - 168.
    In this paper, I try to make a bundle theory of objects consistentwith a temporal parts theory of object persistence. To that end,I propose that such bundles are made up of tropes includingthe co-instantiation relation.
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  15. Temporal Parts and Time Travel.Nikk Effingham - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):225-240.
    This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a (...)
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  16.  48
    Temporal Parts and Spatio-Temporal Analogies.J. W. Meiland - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1):64 - 70.
    To what extent is time similar to space? in this paper it is shown that the claim, Made by richard taylor among others, That time and space are "radically alike" is unfounded. This claim can be supported only by employing the notion of temporal parts. It is shown that if objects are regarded as having temporal parts as well as spatial parts, Then serious disanalogies exist between time and space. Furthermore, If objects are said to (...)
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  17.  44
    Temporal Parts Unmotivated.Michael C. Rea - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.
    In debate about the nature of persistence over time, the view that material objects endure has played the role of “champion” and the view that they perdure has played the role of “challenger.” As in other contests, the champion’s job is merely to defend her title, whereas the challenger’s job is to prove herself worthy. I have no view about how these roles came to be assigned; but the historical fact is that perdurantists have traditionally borne the proverbial burden of (...)
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  18. Change, temporal parts, and the argument from vagueness.Achille C. Varzi - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):485–498.
    The so-called "argument from vagueness", the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is arguably the most powerful and innovative argument recently offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective--I submit--and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each "defect" corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So (...)
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  19. Temporal parts and complex predicates.Thomas Sattig - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):279–286.
    Those who believe that ordinary things have temporal as well as spatial parts must give an account of the truth conditions of temporally modified predications of the form ‘a is F at t ’ in terms of temporal parts. I will argue that the friend of temporal parts is committed to an account of temporal predication that is incompatible with the classical principle of predicate abstraction.
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  20.  23
    Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness.Achille C. Varzi - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):485-498.
    The so-called ‘argument from vagueness’ is among the most powerful and innovative arguments offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective – I submit – and in a number of ways that are worth looking into. But each ‘defect’, each gap in the argument, corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So once all the gaps of the (...)
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  21. Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time.Peter van Inwagen - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):437-459.
    1. Many philosophers think that “What is identity across time?” is an important and meaningful question. I have a great deal of trouble seeing what this question might be. But, very often, if one cannot understand a philosophical question, one’s best course is to look at some alleged answers to it; sometimes these answers enable one to see what question it is that they are offered as answers to. The following passage by Michael Tooley is supposed to provide an answer (...)
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  22.  52
    Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change.David S. Oderberg - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):686-708.
    Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Change occurs in many ways: it can be accidental or substantial; essential or non-essential; intrinsic or extrinsic; subjective or objective. Changes can be physical, spatial, quantitative, qualitative, natural, artefactual, conceptual, linguistic. Events are arguably best defined as changes in an object or objects. All change is from something and into something, and hence is at least a two-term relation, involving a term from which and a term to which.
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  23. Temporal parts and moral personhood.Hud Hudson - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (3):299-316.
    Three Dimensionalists and Four Dimensionalists are engaged in a debate on the topics of persistence and mereology. In this paper, I explore implications of Four Dimensionalism for the formulation of the criterion of personhood and on the question of which individuals satisfy that criterion. In my discussion I argue that the Four Dimensionalist has reason to identify a human person with a proper part of a human organism, and that the Four Dimensionalist has reason to believe that if there is (...)
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  24. Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change.David Simon Oderberg - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):686-708.
    Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Change occurs in many ways: it can be accidental or substantial; essential or non-essential; intrinsic or extrinsic; subjective or objective. Changes can be physical, spatial, quantitative, qualitative, natural, artefactual, conceptual, linguistic. Events are arguably best defined as changes in an object or objects. All change is from something and into something, and hence is at least a two-term relation, involving a term from which and a term to which.
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  25. Temporal Parts. Temporal Portions, and Temporal Slices: An Exercise in Naive Mereology.David H. Sanford - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15:21-33.
    Naive mereology studies ordinary conceptions of part and whole. Parts, unlike portions, have objective boundaries and many things, such as dances and sermons have temporal parts. In order to deal with Mark Heller's claim that temporal parts "are ontologically no more or less basic than the wholes that they compose," we retell the story of Laplace's Genius, here named "Swifty." Although Swifty processes lots of information very quickly, his conceptual repertoire need not extend beyond fundamental (...)
     
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  26. Are My Temporal Parts Agents?Alexander Dietz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):362-379.
    When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub‐personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, (...)
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  27.  38
    Probabilities and temporal parts.Michael F. Patton - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):39-52.
    Adopting temporal parts theory is the most popular way of addressing a host of puzzles about diachronic identity. For example, it is not obvious how I am the same person as the baby who shared my name. With the theory, sameness of person, e.g., consists in being comprised by the same temporally extended, four-dimensional object. However, temporal parts theory has unacceptable consequences for notions of freedom and probability. I show that the only acceptable reading of four-dimensionalism (...)
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  28.  12
    Temporal Parts and Complex Predicates.Thomas Sattig - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):279-286.
  29.  15
    Temporal parts and identity across time, Peter Van Inwagen.Miu Er - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199).
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  30. Foreword to ''Temporal Parts''.Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):319-320.
    A brief introductory note to the Monist issue on "Temporal Parts", setting the background for the eight papers included in the rest of the issue (by Y. Balashov, B. Brogaard, K. Fine, M. Heller, R. LePoidevin, J. Parsons, P. M. Simons, and P. van Inwagen).
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  31.  88
    Do Quantum Objects Have Temporal Parts?Thomas Pashby - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1137-1147.
    This article provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate regarding the problem of persistence. I contend that perdurance, a popular view about persistence which maintains that objects persist by having temporal parts, can be formulated in quantum mechanics due to the existence of a formal analogy between temporal and spatial location. However, this analogy fails due to a ‘no-go’ result which demonstrates that quantum systems cannot be said to have temporal parts in the (...)
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  32. Temporal Parts Unmotivated Michael С Rea.Darren Belousek Balashov, Michael Bergmann & J. B. Hud Hudson - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.
     
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  33.  90
    Temporal predication with temporal parts and temporal counterparts.Thomas Sattig - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):355 – 368.
    If ordinary objects have temporal parts, then temporal predications have the following truth conditions: necessarily, ( a is F) at t iff a has a temporal part that is located at t and that is F. If ordinary objects have temporal counterparts, then, necessarily, ( a is F) at t iff a has a temporal counterpart that is located at t and that is F. The temporal-parts account allows temporal predication to (...)
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  34.  86
    The doctrine of temporal parts and the "no-change" objection.Lawrence Brian Lombard - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):365-372.
    The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is (...)
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  35. Ought a four-dimensionalist to believe in temporal parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these (...)
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  36. Special Relativity, Coexistence And Temporal Parts: A Reply To Gilmore.Yuri Balashov - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):1-40.
    In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a: Philosophical Studies 99, 129–166; 2000b: Philosophy of Science 67 (Suppl), S549–S562), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002: Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263) has subjected my argument to an insightful three fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore’s first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who (...)
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  37.  42
    The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and the "No-Change" Objection.Lawrence Brian Lombard - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):365-372.
    The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is (...)
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  38. Spatial and temporal parts.Jeremy Butterfield - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):32-44.
  39. Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
  40. Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?Josh Parsons - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if (...)
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  41.  30
    Descartes on persistence and temporal parts.Geoffrey Gorham - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press.
    This chapter discusses the “real distinction” between the mind and the body and a demonstration of the immortality of the soul as demonstrated in Descartes’s Meditations. Early readers of Descartes’s work like Arnauld and Mersenne rejected the idea on the grounds that “it does not seem to follow from the fact that the mind is distinct from the body that it is incorruptible or immortal.” In light of this, Descartes devised a more detailed proof of immortality based on two assumptions (...)
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  42. Temporal Parts: Ted Sider. [REVIEW]Daniele Chiffi & Silvia Gaio - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19).
     
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  43. Identity and temporal parts.Thomas Reid - 2009 - In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Arguing About Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 239.
     
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  44. Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these (...)
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  45. Noonan on temporal parts.Graham Spinks - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):215-216.
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  46. The Theory of Temporal Parts-Theorems and Arguments.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (4):49.
     
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  47.  83
    A note on temporal parts.H. W. Noonan - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):151-152.
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  48. Temporal passage and temporal parts.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):79-84.
  49.  60
    Reply to Spinks on Temporal Parts.Harold W. Noonan - 1987 - Analysis 47 (4):187-188.
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  50. Actual Time and Possible Change: A Problem for Modal Arguments for Temporal Parts.Michael T. Traynor - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):180-189.
    Sider (2001) and Hawley (2001) argue that, in order to account for the mere possibility of change, temporal parts must be as fine-grained as possible change, and hence as fine-grained as time. However, when dealing with metaphysical possibility, the fine-grainedness of actual time and the fine-grainedness of possible change can come apart. Once this is taken into account, we see that, on certain assumptions about the actual microstructure of time, the modal arguments of Sider and Hawley lead to (...)
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