Self-consciousness and the double immunity

Philosophy 75 (294):539-570 (2000)
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Abstract

It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.

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2009-01-28

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Andrea Christofidou
University of London

Citations of this work

Human Rationality: Descartes and Aristotle.Andrea Christofidou - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (3):217-236.
Descartes on Selfhood, Conscientia, the First Person and Beyond.Andrea Christofidou - 2023 - In Andrea Strazzoni & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Reading Descartes. Consciousness, Body, and Reasoning. Florence: Firenze University Press. pp. 9-40.
Immunity to error and subjectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):581-604.
Immunity to Error and Subjectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):581-604.

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