American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):147-160 (2021)

Authors
Alon Chasid
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Abstract
This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, ‘mimic’ beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content.
Keywords imagination  pretense  correctness  truth  fiction  fictional worlds  mental representations  Kendall Walton  norms  belief-like imagining  imagination and belief
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References found in this work BETA

The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Kendall L. Walton - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):413-434.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imagining in Response to Fiction: Unpacking the Infrastructure.Alon Chasid - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):31-48.
Not by Imaginings Alone: On How Imaginary Worlds Are Established.Alon Chasid - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):195-212.
A Puzzle About Imagining Believing.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Can Imagination Give Rise to Knowledge?Madeleine Hyde - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm University

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