A problem not peculiar to counterfactual sufficiency

Analysis (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is beset by two rival interpretations: the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation and the counterfactual might interpretation. Waldrop recently argued that the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation conflicts with certain principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. In this paper, I show that Waldrop’s argument can be adapted to prove that the counterfactual might interpretation also conflicts with the same principles. So the problem Waldrop pointed out is not peculiar to the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mountaineering and the Value of Self‐Sufficiency.Philip A. Ebert & Simon Robertson - 2010-09-24 - In Fritz Allhoff & Stephen E. Schmid (eds.), Climbing ‐ Philosophy for Everyone. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 93–105.
Goodman and Parry on Counterfactual.Oswaldo Chateaubriand - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):383–397.
The preemption problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-01-11

Downloads
134 (#130,564)

6 months
134 (#22,526)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Chaoan He
Donghua University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.Lee Walters & Robert Williams - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
Counterfactuals And Possible Worlds.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):381-402.
Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.

View all 12 references / Add more references