Synthese 115 (3):333-354 (1998)

Authors
Laura Ekstrom
College of William and Mary
Abstract
The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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Reprint years 2004
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005009029926
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Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.Laura Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80.
Laws of Nature and Free Will.Pedro Merlussi - 2017 - Dissertation, Durham University

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