Moral Intuitions About Stigmatizing Practices and Feeding Stigmatizing Practices: How Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory Relates to Infectious Disease Stigma

Public Health Ethics 16 (1):102-111 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Despite extensive stigma mitigation efforts, infectious disease stigma remains common. So far, little attention has been paid to the moral psychology of stigmatizing practices (i.e. beliefs, attitudes, actions) rather than the experience of being stigmatized. Addressing the moral psychology behind stigmatizing practices seems necessary to explain the persistence of infectious disease stigma and to develop effective mitigation strategies. Our article proposes building on Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory, which states that moral judgements follow from intuitions rather than conscious reasoning. Conceptual analysis was conducted to show how Haidt’s five moral foundations can be connected to (i) moral judgements about stigmatizing practices and (ii) stigmatizing practices themselves. We found that care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation intuitions can inform moral judgements about stigmatizing practices. Loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation intuitions can sometimes also feed stigmatizing practices. Authority/subversion intuitions can inform moral judgements and stigmatizing practices towards people who disrespect authoritative rules meant to protect public health. Moral dumbfounding and posthoc reasoning might explain the persistence of stigmatizing practices. In conclusion, this study demonstrates the relevance of Haidt’s approach to infectious disease stigma research and mitigation strategies. We hope that this study motivates researchers to further test and assess this approach.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,928

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Invisible fences of the moral domain.Jonathan Haidt - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):552-553.
Moral Intuition.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Haidt et al.’s Case for Moral Pluralism Revisited.Tanya De Villiers-Botha - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):244-261.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-03-22

Downloads
11 (#1,138,050)

6 months
6 (#520,776)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?