Moral Intuition

In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge (2018)
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Abstract

This chapter articulates a standard practice in moral theory: eliciting intuitions and adjusting one’s moral theory to accommodate them. It then critically discusses different views about the nature of moral intuitions, and different views about the epistemic role of moral intuitions. Along the way, it examines various philosophical and empirical concerns that inform the current debates.

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Matthew Bedke
University of British Columbia

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