Abstract

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct and present in a critical perspective the main methodological devices of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism, which introduces the idea of the overlapped consensus as a way to guarantee, in a political sense, social justice within contemporary democratic societies. Those methodological devices are presented in order to reveal their conceptual failures when contrasted with real world situations and to indicate three elements: a) the psychologism of the theory which reduces the individuals of the comprehensive doctrines to an inhuman procedural forgetting of the historical facticity that defines them and provides them with meaning and identity; b) how unfair the overlapped consensus might be, considering that it is developed without taking into account the doctrines and at the expenses of the historical processes for power and struggles for recognition of such doctrines; iii) the limited reach of the methodological devices when applied to the real world, i.e., that when those devices are faced with the realities of the doctrines they lack practical justification. Because of that, liberalism should be considered as another tradition which struggles with the doctrines.