Evolution, the emotions, and rationality in social interaction

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):156-157 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although Colman's criticisms of orthodox game theory are convincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multidisciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in particular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when facing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for modifying orthodox game theory.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Game theory need not abandon individual maximization.John Monterosso & George Ainslie - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):171-171.
Beyond rationality: Rigor without mortis in game theory.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
Toward a cognitive game theory.Ivaylo Vlaev & Nick Chater - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):178-179.
The name game updated.Katherine Nelson - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1114-1114.
Modeling social and evolutionary games.Angela Potochnik - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):202-208.
Why not go all the way.Richard Schuster - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):173-174.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
46 (#355,984)

6 months
3 (#1,046,015)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references