Coordinating behavior is widespread in contexts that include courtship, aggression, and cooperation for shared outcomes. The social significance of cooperative coordination (CC) is usually downplayed by learning theorists, evolutionary biologists, and game theorists in favor of an individual behavior → outcome perspective predicated on maximizing payoffs for all participants. To more closely model CC as it occurs under free-ranging conditions, pairs of rats were rewarded for coordinated shuttling within a shared chamber with unrestricted social interaction. Results show that animals learned (...) to work together with sensitivity to the task and type of partner. Moreover, social interaction and coordination influenced both consumption of the reward solution immediately following a session and preference for cooperation, suggesting that affective states and incentives related to cooperation extend beyond the outcomes obtained. These results support field studies by showing not only how cooperation is performed but also the importance of considering how the behavior of cooperating affects outcomes and preference for cooperating. (shrink)

Altruism and cooperation are explained as learned behaviors arising from a pattern of repeated acts whose acquired value outweighs the short-term gains following single acts. But animals and young children, tempted by immediate gains, have difficulty learning behaviors of self-control. An alternative source of reinforcement, shared by animals and humans, arises from social interaction that normally accompanies cooperation and altruism in nature.

Pavlovian feed-forward mechanisms represent an individual perspective that ignores how repeated interactions between the same individuals lead to social relationships. These can determine social cues, coordinated behaviors, asymmetries between partners, and physiological and emotional states associated with social interaction.

In the target article, human cruelty is linked to intrinsic reinforcement from engaging in the behavior without any recommendations for a research program to validate or test for such reinforcement and its independence from ultimate adaptive outcomes. Suggestions are offered in this commentary for such a program.

Examples are cited of group hunting in chimpanzees, lions, and hyenas consistent with evidence for intentionality, organization, and coordination. These challenge the claim for shared intentionality as uniquely human. Even when rarely performed in this way, the significance of such behaviors should not be minimized, especially if this level of “intelligent” action emerges spontaneously in the wild.

“Psychology Game Theory” grafts social-process explanations onto classical game theory to explain deviations from instrumental rationality caused by the social properties of cooperation. This leads to confusion between cooperation as a social or individual behavior, and between ultimate and proximate explanations. If game theory models explain the existence of cooperation, different models are needed for understanding the proximate social processes that underlie cooperation in the real world.