Why high-risk, non-expected-utility-maximising gambles can be rational and beneficial: the case of HIV cure studies

Journal of Medical Ethics (2):1-6 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to enrol participants in studies with high risk–benefit ratios. This work supports the view that researchers should instead defer to the considered preferences of the participants themselves. This essay briefly explains this recent work, and then explores its application to these two questions in more detail.

Similar books and articles

Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.
Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.
Expected utility without utility.E. Castagnoli & M. Li Calzi - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):281-301.
Decision-Value Utilitarianism.Wesley Cooper - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):39-50.
On Risk and Rationality.Brad Armendt - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-9.
Expected utility and risk.Paul Weirich - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):419-442.
Nozick, Ramsey, and symbolic utility.Wesley Cooper - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (3):301-322.
Conditional utility and its place in decision theory.Paul Weirich - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (11):702-715.
On the application of J.m. Keynes's approach to decision making.Michael E. Brady - 1994 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (2):99 – 112.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-07-05

Downloads
740 (#21,638)

6 months
112 (#37,048)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lara Buchak
Princeton University

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.

Add more references