Two conceptions of access-consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):147-147 (1997)
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Abstract

Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.

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10.1017/s0140525x97230050

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