Phenomenal access: A moving target

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261 (1995)
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Abstract

Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.

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Joseph Levine
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Author's response.Ned Block - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
Sidestepping the semantics of “consciousness”.Michael V. Antony - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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