Consciousness as a social construction

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):197-199 (1999)
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Abstract

If the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness () and the brain cannot be closed by current naturalistic theories of mind, one might instead try to dissolve the explanatory gap problem. We hold that such a dissolution can start from the notion of consciousness as a social construction. In his target article, however, Block (1995) argues that the thesis that consciousness is a social construction is trivially false if it is construed to be about phenomenal consciousness. He ridicules the idea that the occurrence of p-consciousness requires that the subject of p-consciousness already have the concept of p-consciousness. This idea is not as ridiculous as Block supposes. To see this, one must accept that in a unique sense, p-consciousness is what we as the subjects of consciousness takeit to be. Furthermore, the notion of consciousness as a social construction does not depend on the view that the concept of consciousness somehow precedes the occurrence of consciousness as such. In sum, consciousness can plausibly be seen as a social construction, and this view can promote a dissolution of the explanatory gap problem

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Social construction and consciousness.Rom Harré - 2012 - Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):13-36.
Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousness.Ned Block - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):199-201.

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