Sidestepping the semantics of “consciousness”

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290 (2004)

Abstract

Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term “consciousness.” However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that “consciousness” is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of “consciousness.”.

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2009-01-28

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Michael Antony
University of Haifa

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