The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory

In R. G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality. Cambridge University Press. pp. 252-289 (1993)
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David Brink
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Limited Aggregation and Risk.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (2):117-159.
How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.
Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):281-293.

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