Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):205 - 225 (1988)

Abstract
Different people live different lives. Each life consists of experiences that are not shared with the other lives. These facts are sometimes referred to as the ‘separateness of persons.’ Some writers have appealed to the separateness of persons to support or to criticize moral views. John Rawls thinks that the separateness of persons supports egalitarianism, while Robert Nozick believes that it supports a rights view. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts in favor of a particular moral view the ‘positive connection.’ Both these writers think that utilitarianism is objectionable because it ignores the moral importance of the separateness of persons. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts against a moral view the ‘negative connection.’In this paper I will discuss several different attempts at explaining the connection between the separateness of persons and specific moral views. I will begin by describing how egalitarianism, unlike utilitarianism, treats individual lives as morally important units. I will discuss the kind of egalitarianism that aims at equality, but the same points could be made about egalitarian views that give priority to helping the worst off or require that everyone should receive at least a specified minimum share of resources or happiness.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.1988.10717174
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,066
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Shlomi Segall - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):142-155.
From the Nature of Persons to the Structure of Morality.Robert Noggle - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):531-565.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rights, Duties and the Separateness of Persons.Timothy Hinton - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):73-91.
The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory.Matt Zwolinski - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (2):147-165.
Value Receptacles.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):322-332.
Altruism and the Separateness of Persons.Sam Black - 2001 - Social Theory and Practice 27 (3):361-385.
The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2011 - Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
Aggregation, Rights, and the Separateness of Persons.Alastair Norcross - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):1-15.
Egalitarianism.Dennis McKerlie - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (2):223-237.
Egalitarianism Reconsidered.Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total views
76 ( #150,340 of 2,498,784 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #421,542 of 2,498,784 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes