Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602 (2018)

Authors
Daniel J. Singer
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Epistemic consequentialists think that epistemic norms are about believing the truth and avoiding error. Recently, a number of authors have rejected epistemic consequentialism on the basis that it incorrectly sanctions tradeoffs of epistemic goodness. Here, I argue that epistemic consequentialists should borrow two lessons from ethical consequentialists to respond to these worries. Epistemic consequentialists should construe their view as an account of right belief, which they distinguish from other notions like rational and justified belief. Epistemic consequentialists should also make their view ‘sophisticated,’ in the sense of Railton. Epistemic consequentialism, I conclude, is best construed as sharing much of its structure with prominent act-consequentialist views in ethics. Epistemic consequentialism has an advantage over its ethical counterpart though: the key claim of the view is practically universally accepted, which gives us an additional reason to think it’s true.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqx056
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.
Epistemic Freedom Revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
Is Logic Distinctively Normative?Ivar Labukt - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):1025-1043.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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