Virtue, emotion, and attention

In Heather Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 115–131 (2010)
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 Acknowledgments References.

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Keywords

virtue and emotion ‐ virtue, emotion and attention   perceptual model of emotions ‐ analogous to perceptions of value   primary capacity for recognizing value ‐ a non‐emotional capacity   perceptual model of emotions, fear ‐ perceiving something as dangerous ‐ and anger, perceiving something as insulting   virtue, not requiring us to constantly check perceptual mechanisms ‐ attentional focus being impossible   ordinary sensory perceptions, not persisting ‐ not capturing and consuming our attention this way   neurophysiological perspective ‐ on what happens in attentional capture and consumption   sentimentalist accounts, what it is for something ‐ to be dangerous or shameful   actual relation between emotion, virtue, and attention – different, to that proposed by defender of perceptual model   supporters of perceptual model, optimistic ‐ thinking that emotions themselves constitute reasons for belief and action

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2011

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9781444391398   9781444335620

DOI

10.1002/9781444391398.ch7

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Michael S. Brady
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Are emotions perceptions of value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.

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