Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts

In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press (2009)

Bennett W. Helm
Franklin and Marshall College
One central argument in favor of perceptual accounts of emotions concerns recalcitrant emotions: emotions that persist in the face of repudiating judgments. For, it is argued, to understand how the conflict between recalcitrant emotions and judgment falls short of incoherence in judgment, we need to understand recalcitrant emotions to be something like perceptual illusions of value, so that in normal, non-recalcitrant cases emotions are non-illusory perceptions of value. I argue that these arguments fail and that a closer examination of recalcitrant emotions reveals important disanalogies with perception that undermine the perceptual model of emotions.
Keywords emotions  motivation  rationality  neo-Jamesian  perception  import
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