If Counterfactuals Were Excluded from Historical Reasoning..

Journal of the Philosophy of History 10 (3):370-381 (2016)
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Abstract

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 370 - 381 The argument of this paper is that counterfactuals are indispensable in reasoning in general and historical reasoning in particular. It illustrates the role of counterfactuals in the study of history and explores the connection between counterfactuals and the notions of historical necessity and contingency. Entertaining alternatives to the actual course of events is conducive to the assessment of the relative weight and impact of the various factors that combine to bring about a certain result. Counterfactuals are essentially involved in understanding what it means for an event, an action, or an individual to make a difference. Making a difference, in turn, is shown to be a central category of historical reasoning. Counterfactuals, though sensitive to the description they use, make objective claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence.

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Contingentism for historians.Jeroen Bouterse - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 96 (C):27-34.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
Causation.D. Lewis - 1973 - In Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
Causal relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.

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