Personhood and Disorders of Consciousness: Finding Room in Person-Centered Healthcare

European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 8 (3):391-405 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Advocates of the Person-Centered Healthcare (PCH) approach say that PCH is a response to a failure of caring for patients as persons. Nevertheless, there are many human subjects falling to fulfill the requirements of a traditional philosophical definition of personhood. Hence, if we take, PCH seriously, a greater clarification of the key terminology of PCH is urgently needed. It seems necessary, for instance, that the concept of the person should be extended in order to include those individuals with insipient or immature levels of consciousness, as well as those who are severely and permanently mentally handicapped. In this article, we will depart from some well-known philosophical concepts of what it means to be a person and try to offer a broader and more inclusive meaning. We suggest that persons are human beings with a socially recognized biography, which implies to recognize as persons individuals with necessities, but also with narratives about their interests and claims, expressed sometimes by other people related to them. This is particularly the case of individuals that suffer from severe disorders of consciousness. For those, is not only care that matters; respect matters too. Caregivers should therefore not only sympathetically care for the well-being of these people; they should also be concerned to respect their interests and claims by interpreting them empathetically, in the light of their biographical story. Our conclusion is that, in order to be coherent, PCH must consider individuals with severe disorders of consciousness as persons and we think that our revised concept of personhood fits with this requirement.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Personhood and care in disorders of consciousness. An ontological, patient-centred perspective.Federico Zilio - 2020 - Medicina E Morale. Rivista Internazionale di Bioetica 69 (3):327-346.
Dimensions of personhood.Heikki Ikäheimo & Arto Laitinen - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):6-16.
Personhood, consciousness, and god: how to be a proper pantheist.Sam Coleman - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (1):77-98.
Persistence Without Personhood: A New Model.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):346-364.
On the very idea of criteria for personhood.Timothy Chappell - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-27.
The personhood of the human embryo.John F. Crosby - 1993 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (4):399-417.
The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2014 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (3):229-247.
Personhood.Michael Tooley - 1998 - In Peter Singer & Helga Kuhse (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 117-126.
Becoming a Person.Matthew C. Altman - 2011 - In Kant and Applied Ethics. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 241–282.
The Moral and Metaphysical Aspects of Personhood.Michael Francis Goodman - 1986 - Dissertation, Michigan State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-12-04

Downloads
141 (#129,983)

6 months
141 (#24,010)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marco Antonio Azevedo
Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Wenfang Wang.
The metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.

View all 30 references / Add more references