A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394 (2012)
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Abstract

Realism and anti-realism about a domain of thought are metaphysical theses that involve the natures of the truthmakers in that domain and the truthmaking relation that is operant in the domain. Truthmaker theory is not exclusive territory for realists: anti-realist views are also best understood in terms of how they understand truthmakers and truthmaking. In particular, I explore the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show how it makes sense of quasi-realism. In addition to critically examining some extant accounts of the relationship between realism and truthmaking, I offer an account that best captures the nature of the various realism debates.

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Jamin Asay
Purdue University

Citations of this work

Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
We don’t need no explanation.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):903-921.
On ways of being true.Mark Jago - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-16.
Tensed Truthmaker Theory.Sam Baron - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):923-944.
Much ado about aboutness.Sam Baron, Reginald Mary Chua, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (3).

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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