Modelling truthmaking

Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):211-230 (2000)
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According to one tradition in realist philosophy, 'truthmaking' amounts to necessitation. That is, an object x is a truthmaker for the claim A if x exists, and the existence of x necessitates the truth of A. I argued in my paper "Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity" [14], that if we wish to use this account of truthmaking, we ought understand the entailment connective "=>" in such a claim as a relevant entailment, in the tradition of Anderson and Belnap and their co-workers [1, 2, 8, 11]. Furthermore, I proposed a number of theses about truthmaking as necessitation. The most controversial of these is the disjunction thesis: x makes a disjunction A v B true if and only if it makes one of the disjuncts (A or B) true. That paper left one important task unfinished. I did not explain how the theses about truthmaking could be true together. In this paper I give a consistency proof, by providing a model for the theses of truthmaking in my earlier paper. This result does two things. First, it shows that the theses of truthmaking are jointly consistent. Second, it provides an independently philosophically motivated formal model for relevant logics in the 'possible worlds' tradition of Routley and Meyer [8, 16, 17].



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Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic.Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):305-405.
Truthmakers, entailment and necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Truthmakers.Fraser MacBride - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
New powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2021 - Synthese 199:2671-2700.

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References found in this work

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Bertrand Russell - 1940 - Open Court. Edited by David Pears.
The Situation in Logic.Jon Barwise - 1988 - Cambridge, England: Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
Truthmakers, entailment and necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Constructible falsity.David Nelson - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):16-26.

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