Moral realism: a defence

New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.

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Author's Profile

Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison

References found in this work

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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