Ryle and Intentionality

Metaphysica 10 (1):49-63 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX


After some opening comments on how I think one should approach the philosophy of mind, I look at what relatively little Gilbert Ryle had to say explicitly about intentionality, that occurring almost exclusively in his several papers on phenomenology. Then, I discuss the notion of intentionality with respect to the doctrines of The Concept of Mind, although neither the word nor the idea, strictly speaking, appears anywhere in the book. Following more exposition of my own views, including an argument I have made for a certain specific theory of intentionality, I close with some reflections on Ryle as a modern-day Aristotelian



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,452

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

107 (#163,906)

6 months
10 (#396,727)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Mentality and Object: Computational and Cognitive Diachronic Emergence.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 20 (2):296-356.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
[Letter from Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
Intentionality-Theory and the Nature of Thinking.Gilbert Ryle - 1973 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27 (2/3=104/105):255.

View all 22 references / Add more references