Many activities impose risks of harm on other people. One such class of risks are those that individuals culpably impose on others, such as the risk arising from reckless driving. Do such risks in themselves constitute a harm, over and above any harm that actually eventuates? This paper considers three recent views that each answer in the affirmative. I argue that each fails to overcome what I call the ‘interference objection’. The risk of harm itself, whether taken as a subjective (...) or an objective risk, is unable to interfere with the interests of victims in order to constitute a harm. This does not mean that a risk of harm cannot itself be wrongful, but the conclusion does weaken the moral objectionableness of impositions of risks of harm. (shrink)

This paper combines considerations from ethics, medicine and public health policy to articulate and defend a systematic case for mask wearing mandates. The paper argues for two main claims of general interest in favour of these mandates. First, mask wearing mandates provide a more effective, just and fair way to tackle the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic than policy alternatives such as laissez-faire approaches, mask wearing recommendations and physical distancing measures. And second, the proffered objections against mask wearing mandates may justify some (...) exemptions for specific categories of individuals, but do not cast doubt on the justifiability of these mandates. Hence, unless some novel decisive objections are put forward against mask wearing mandates, governments should adopt such mandates. (shrink)