We investigate iterating the construction of $C^{*}$, the L-like inner model constructed using first order logic augmented with the “cofinality $\omega $ ” quantifier. We first show that $\left (C^{*}\right )^{C^{*}}=C^{*}\ne L$ is equiconsistent with $\mathrm {ZFC}$, as well as having finite strictly decreasing sequences of iterated $C^{*}$ s. We then show that in models of the form $L[U]$ we get infinite decreasing sequences of length $\omega $, and that an inner model with a measurable cardinal is required for that.

Given a countable transitive model of set theory and a partial order contained in it, there is a natural countable Borel equivalence relation on generic filters over the model; two are equivalent if they yield the same generic extension. We examine the complexity of this equivalence relation for various partial orders, focusing on Cohen and random forcing. We prove, among other results, that the former is an increasing union of countably many hyperfinite Borel equivalence relations, and hence is amenable, while (...) the latter is neither amenable nor treeable. (shrink)

We present a class forcing notion, uniformly definable for ordinals η, which forces the ground model to be the ηth inner mantle of the extension, in which the sequence of inner mantles has length at least η. This answers a conjecture of Fuchs, Hamkins, and Reitz [1] in the positive. We also show that forces the ground model to be the ηth iterated of the extension, where the sequence of iterated s has length at least η. We conclude by showing (...) that the lengths of the sequences of inner mantles and of iterated s can be separated to be any two ordinals you please. (shrink)

Fix a cardinal κ. We can ask the question: what kind of a logic L is needed to characterize all models of cardinality κ up to isomorphism by their L-theories? In other words: for which logics L it is true that if any models A and B of cardinality κ satisfy the same L-theory then they are isomorphic?It is always possible to characterize models of cardinality κ by their Lκ+,κ+-theories, but we are interested in finding a “small” logic L, i.e., (...) the sentences of L are hereditarily of smaller cardinality than κ. For any cardinal κ it is independent of ZFC whether any such small definable logic L exists. If it exists it can be second order logic for κ=ω and fourth order logic or certain infinitary second order logic Lκ,ω source for uncountable κ. All models of cardinality κ can always be characterized by their theories in a small logic with generalized quantifiers, but the logic may be not definable in the language of set theory. Our work continues and extends the work of Ajtai [Miklos Ajtai, Isomorphism and higher order equivalence, Ann. Math. Logic 16 181–203]. (shrink)

In this paper we isolate a notion that we call “formalism freeness” from Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, which asks for a transfer of the Turing analysis of computability to the cases of definability and provability. We suggest an implementation of Gödel's idea in the case of definability, via versions of the constructible hierarchy based on fragments of second order logic. We also trace the notion of formalism freeness in the very wide context of developments in mathematical logic in the (...) 20th century. (shrink)

If we replace first-order logic by second-order logic in the original definition of Gödel’s inner model L, we obtain the inner model of hereditarily ordinal definable sets [33]. In this paper...

A new axiom is proposed, the Ground Axiom, asserting that the universe is not a nontrivial set forcing extension of any inner model. The Ground Axiom is first-order expressible, and any model of ZFC has a class forcing extension which satisfies it. The Ground Axiom is independent of many well-known set-theoretic assertions including the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, the assertion V=HOD that every set is ordinal definable, and the existence of measurable and supercompact cardinals. The related Bedrock Axiom, asserting that the (...) universe is a set forcing extension of a model satisfying the Ground Axiom, is also first-order expressible, and its negation is consistent. (shrink)

A DO model (here also referred to a Paris model) is a model of set theory all of whose ordinals are first order definable in . Jeffrey Paris (1973) initiated the study of DO models and showed that (1) every consistent extension T of ZF has a DO model, and (2) for complete extensions T, T has a unique DO model up to isomorphism iff T proves V=OD. Here we provide a comprehensive treatment of Paris models. Our results include the (...) following:1. If T is a consistent completion of ZF+V≠OD, then T has continuum-many countable nonisomorphic Paris models.2. Every countable model of ZFC has a Paris generic extension.3. If there is an uncountable well-founded model of ZFC, then for every infinite cardinal κ there is a Paris model of ZF of cardinality κ which has a nontrivial automorphism.4. For a model ZF, is a prime model ⇒ is a Paris model and satisfies AC⇒ is a minimal model. Moreover, Neither implication reverses assuming Con(ZF). (shrink)

We use a reverse Easton forcing iteration to obtain a universe with a definable well-order, while preserving the GCH and proper classes of a variety of very large cardinals. This is achieved by coding using the principle ◊ $_{k^ - }^* $ at a proper class of cardinals k. By choosing the cardinals at which coding occurs sufficiently sparsely, we are able to lift the embeddings witnessing the large cardinal properties without having to meet any non-trivial master conditions.

We prove two general results about the preservation of extendible and $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals under a wide class of forcing iterations (Theorems 5.4 and 7.5). As applications we give new proofs of the preservation of Vopěnka’s Principle and $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals under Jensen’s iteration for forcing the GCH [17], previously obtained in [8, 27], respectively. We prove that $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals are preserved by forcing with standard Easton-support iterations for any possible $\Delta _2$ -definable behaviour of the power-set function on (...) regular cardinals. We show that one can force proper class-many disagreements between the universe and HOD with respect to the calculation of successors of regular cardinals, while preserving $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals. We also show, assuming the GCH, that the class forcing iteration of Cummings–Foreman–Magidor for forcing $\diamondsuit _{\kappa ^+}^+$ at every $\kappa $ [10] preserves $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals. We give an optimal result on the consistency of weak square principles and $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals. In the last section prove another preservation result for $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals under very general (not necessarily definable or weakly homogeneous) class forcing iterations. As applications we prove the consistency of $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals with $\mathrm {{V}}=\mathrm {{HOD}}$, and also with $\mathrm {GA}$ (the Ground Axiom) plus $\mathrm {V}\neq \mathrm {HOD}$, the latter being a strengthening of a result from [14]. (shrink)

We prove that Standardization fails in every nontrivial universe definable in the nonstandard set theory BST, and that a natural characterization of the standard universe is both consistent with and independent of BST. As a consequence we obtain a formulation of nonstandard class theory in the ∈-language.