For many years, philosophers and other scholars have commented on the remarkable similarity between Spinoza and the Stoics, with some even going so far as to speak of 'Spinoza the Stoic'. Until now, however, no one has systematically examined the relationship between the two systems. In Spinoza and the Stoics Jon Miller takes on this task, showing how key elements of Spinoza's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical psychology, and ethics relate to their Stoic counterparts. Drawing on a wide-range of secondary literature including (...) the most up-to-date scholarship and a close examination of the textual evidence, Jon Miller not only reveals the sense in which Spinoza was, and was not, a Stoic, but also offers new insights into how each system should be understood in itself. His book will be of great interest to scholars and students of ancient philosophy, early modern philosophy, Spinoza, and the philosophy of the Stoics. (shrink)

Firearm injury in the United States is a public health crisis in which physicians are uniquely situated to intervene. However, their ability to mitigate harm is limited by a complex array of laws and regulations that shape their role in firearm injury prevention. This piece uses four clinical scenarios to illustrate how these laws and regulations impact physician practice, including patient counseling, injury reporting, and the use of court orders and involuntary holds. Unintended consequences on clinical practice of laws intended (...) to reduce firearm injury are also discussed. Lessons drawn from these cases suggest that physicians require more nuanced education on this topic, and that policymakers should consult front-line healthcare providers when designing firearm policies. (shrink)

This article argues for the importance of distinguishing the form of a theory of happiness from its content. It applies this distinction to ancient ethics, to show that almost all ancient philosophers subscribed to the same basic form or conception of happiness while differing over the details or content of happiness.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is one of the most important ethical treatises ever written, and has had a profound influence on the subsequent development of ethics and moral psychology. This collection of essays, written by both senior and younger scholars in the field, presents a thorough and close examination of the work. The essays address a broad range of issues including the compositional integrity of the Ethics, the nature of desire, the value of emotions, happiness and the virtues. The result is (...) a volume which will challenge and advance the scholarship on the Ethics, establishing new ways of viewing and appreciating the work for all scholars of Aristotle. (shrink)

Reparations is an idea whose time has come. From civilian victims of war in Iraq and South America to descendents of slaves in the US to citizens of colonized nations in Africa and south Asia to indigenous peoples around the world--these groups and their advocates are increasingly arguing for the importance of addressing historical injustices that have long been either ignored or denied. This volume contributes to these debates by focusing the attention of a group of highly distinguished international experts (...) on the ways that reparations claims figure in contemporary political and social justice movements. Four broad types of reparations claims are examined, those involving indigenous peoples, the legacy of slavery in the United States, victims of war and conflict, and colonialism. In each instance, scholars and activists argue about the character of the injustice for which reparations are owed, why it is important to take these demands seriously, and what form redress should take. The aim is not consensus but to exhibit better the complexity of the issues involved--a goal which the interdisciplinary nature of the volume furthers--as well as the importance of taking seriously both conceptual issues and the actual politics of reparations. (shrink)

Early modern philosophers looked for inspiration to the later ancient thinkers when they rebelled against the dominant Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. The impact of the Hellenistic philosophers on such philosophers as Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza and Locke was profound and is ripe for reassessment. This collection of essays offers precisely that. Leading historians of philosophy explore the connections between Hellenistic and early modern philosophy in ways that take advantage of new scholarly and philosophical advances. The essays display a challenging range of (...) methods and will be an invaluable point of reference for philosophers, historians of ideas and classicists. (shrink)

Let me start with my conclusions: like most other philosophers of his era, Spinoza did not have well-developed views on consciousness and its place in the mind. Somewhat paradoxically, however, a basic tenet of his metaphysics generated a problem which might have been solved if he had thought more about those issues. So in the end, then, Spinoza did not have much to say about consciousness even though the coherency or at least the plausibility of his system demanded it. With (...) such being my assessment of Spinoza’s views on consciousness, it will come as no surprise that I regard the prospects for a robust and coherent Spinozistic theory of consciousness as dim. As explained later, I differ in this respect from some prominent Spinoza scholars. At the same time, even if we won’t find much guidance from Spinoza for thinking about consciousness, I believe that he has much to teach us about the mind. In my view, Spinoza’s philosophy of mind is instructive precisely because it attempts to understand the mind without reference to consciousness. This can and should be a healthy corrective to contemporary philosophy of mind, which is prone to inflate the place of consciousness in the mind. To make and defend all of these points, I divide my chapter into four sections. In the first, I offer a sketch of consciousness in seventeenth-century philosophy generally and Spinoza’s work specifically, a sketch which is intended to show that consciousness did not feature prominently in their accounts of the mind. Then, I note how a major problem plagues Spinoza’s account of the relationship between the physical and the mental, and I show how two attempted solutions of this problem both fail. By way of conclusion, I suggest why Spinoza might be interesting to philosophers of mind today, his silence on consciousness notwithstanding. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) [Hugo, Huigh or Hugeianus de Groot] was a towering figure in philosophy, law, political theory and associated fields during the seventeenth century and for hundreds of years afterwards. His work ranged over a wide array of topics, though he is best known to philosophers today for his contributions to the natural law theories of normativity which emerged in the later medieval and early modern periods. This article will attempt to explain his views on the law of nature (...) and related issues while simultaneously providing some broader assessment of his place in the history of ideas. (shrink)

Aristotle's ethics are the most important in the history of Western philosophy, but little has been said about the reception of his ethics by his many successors. The present volume offers thirteen newly commissioned essays covering figures and periods from the ancient world, starting with the impact of the ethics on Hellenistic philosophy, taking in medieval, Jewish and Islamic reception and extending as far as Kant and the twentieth century. Each essay focuses on a single philosopher, school of philosophers, or (...) philosophical era. The accounts examine and compare Aristotle's views and those of his heirs and also offer a reception history of the ethics, dealing with matters such as the availability and circulation of Aristotle's texts during the periods in question. The resulting volume will be a valuable source of information and arguments for anyone working in the history of ethics. (shrink)

MORE THAN MOST PHILOSOPHERS, Spinoza needed a coherent and sophisticated set of views on the nature of possibility: many of his most important philosophical positions and arguments depended on it. As one example, take Ethics IP33. This Proposition—among the most famous of the Ethics— states, “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.” In a salutary attempt to clarify the meaning of IP33 et relata, Spinoza adds in (...) the first Scholium to IP33 that “by these propositions I have shown more clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they can be called contingent.” Now, such assertions were bound to give rise to numerous objections and Spinoza knew it. To meet these objections, he immediately proceeds to one of the most powerful: namely, are there not things that actually have been “produced by God” that need not have been “produced by God?” And would it not make sense to call these things “contingent or possible?” In reply, Spinoza reinterprets the concept of possibility. We call existing things “contingent” “only because of a defect of our knowledge.” There are, he continues, two types of deficiency that lead us to regard existing things as “contingent or possible”: either we do not know “that the thing’s essence involves a contradiction” or we do know that the thing’s essence does not involve a contradiction but we do not know enough about the “order of causes” to affirm anything “certainly about its existence.”. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether any ideas are innate in the human mind and if so, what they might be. The issues here are real and important but it often seems that the discussion of them isn’t. One of the main reasons that these discussions are frequently so frustrating is that the various sides seem to be talking past each other rather than engaging in genuine argument. When this happens, it seems to me that it is usually because the issues (...) they are discussing have not been formulated clearly enough. To avoid that problem and also to motivate what follows, I want to begin with an overview of some philosophical concepts and questions before I get to the historical part of my paper. (shrink)

The neuroscientists Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg, in addition to defending an empirically fruitful model of mystical experiences, argue that such experiences constitute evidence for the existence of a transcendent reality, which they call "Absolute Unitary Being." D'Aquili and Newberg point out that mystical experiences carry with them a vivid sense of reality, and that they involve characteristic forms of brain activity, just like perceptions of objects in ordinary waking consciousness. Their argument for Absolute Unitary Being fails, however, since the (...) vivid sense of reality of an experience is not the sole criterion by which to judge its veridicality, since the object of mystical experiences cannot be confirmed by independent observers, and since there is no evidence for a mechanism by which mystics experience a transcendent reality. (shrink)

In the early modern period, laws of nature underwent two re markable changes: first, their role in science and philosophy was greatly expanded as they became central to investigation and explanation; and second, ontology (are the laws “real” or not?) and induction emerged as far and away the most important problems of interpretation. The dramatic expansion in the variety of the laws and their range of application, together with the emergence of ontology and induction as (the) paramount problems of interpretation, (...) so revolutionized thinking about such laws that it is hard for us, nowadays, to conceive of them in any other terms. For both historical and philosophical reasons, however, it is important that we try: historical, because as a matter of fact philosophers and scientists did not always conceive of laws of nature as we do today; philosophical, because there are ways of conceiving of the laws, different from the dominant conception nowadays, which, if properly attended to, might prove instructive. (shrink)

Scorned by analytic philosophers for much of the twentieth century, the a priori has been newly befriended in recent years. This development is healthy but there is reason to be concerned about how it is unfolding. In particular, it is largely characterized by a certain historical myopia: contemporary philosophers are able to see back to Kant but not much beyond him. While it may be true that the a priori changed with Kant, this in itself provides us with a reason (...) to go back before him. For other conceptualizations of the a priori, all but forgotten now, might help us to meet worries about it that Kant's familiar version cannot. (shrink)

There is a definite stress on the primacy of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding over A Treatise of Human Nature by the so-called New Humeans, who in turn, advocate the sceptical/causal realist interpretation of Hume's empiricism. This paper shows how there has been a deliberate attempt by them to omit and distort certain negative aspects of Hume's life in the belief that in order to accept their interpretations we must first acknowledge that, (1) the Enquiry is the superior text and, (...) (2) reject any criticisms suggesting that Hume only wrote it to help promote the Treatise and fulfil his ambitions for literary fame. (shrink)

Scorned by analytic philosophers for much of the twentieth century, the a priori has been newly befriended in recent years. This development is healthy but there is reason to be concerned about how it is unfolding. In particular, it is largely characterized by a certain historical myopia: contemporary philosophers are able to see back to Kant but not much beyond him. While it may be true that the a priori changed with Kant, this in itself provides us with a reason (...) to go back before him. For other conceptualizations of the a priori, all but forgotten now, might help us to meet worries about it that Kant's familiar version cannot. (shrink)

Some of these authors have “mixed” views: for example, MacKenzie (and perhaps Arbini) ... Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind, Studies in the History ..

This paper takes up and provides three answers to the question “Why study philosophy?” Beginning with a discussion of why this question has been ignored in literature pertaining to the teaching of philosophy, the paper turns to an analysis of what it means to ask about the importance of philosophy, pointing out that the question is ambiguous with other questions like “why should so-and-so study philosophy” or “why does so-and-so study philosophy.” The author then provides three answers that are similar (...) to those provided by Hume: one should study philosophy because it may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The paper argues for the superiority of these answers over traditional responses and points to the importance of this question in teaching philosophy. (shrink)

This paper examines Grotius's knowledge of Stobaeus's magnificent anthology of classical literature. After summarizing the contents and significance of that anthology, it shows that Grotius had a life-long interest in and extensive knowledge of the work. Despite this, and even though Grotius made important contributions to the revitalization of Stoicism in the seventeenth century, he never once mentions the material in Chapter Seven of Book II of Stobaeus's work, material which is widely regarded nowadays as a vital source for the (...) ethical views of ancient Stoics. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of this omission for the broader revival of Stoicism in the early modern period. (shrink)

In this discussion note, I put forth evidence to argue against the recent assertions made in favor of the late-1740s or early-1750s date for the composition of Hume’s memoranda. In particular, I show that the claims made regarding Hume’s reference to Strabo in the memoranda do not provide evidence for such a late date of composition but, rather, provide evidence for the date of composition being considerably earlier.

ABSTRACT: In this article I argue that Hume's empiricism allows for time to exist as a real distinct impression of succession, not, as many claim, merely as a nominal abstract idea. In the first part of this article I show how for Hume it is succession and not duration that constitutes time, and, further, that only duration is fictional. In the second part, I show that according to the way Hume describes the functions of the memory and imagination, it is (...) possible to explain how we are able to perceive a distinct impression of succession.RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, je soutiens, à l'encontre de plusieurs, que l'empirisme de Hume conçoit le temps comme une impression réelle et distincte de succession, voire, une idée nominale et abstraite. Je montre en premier lieu que Hume définit le temps, non en termes de durée, mais de succession, et que cette notion de durée est fictive. À partir de la description de Hume des fonctions de la mémoire et de l'imagination, je montre en second lieu qu'il est possible d'expliquer comment nous sommes capables d'une impression distincte de succession. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this article I argue that Hume's empiricism allows for time to exist as a real distinct impression of succession, not, as many claim, merely as a nominal abstract idea. In the first part of this article I show how for Hume it is succession and not duration that constitutes time, and, further, that only duration is fictional. In the second part, I show that according to the way Hume describes the functions of the memory and imagination, it is (...) possible to explain how we are able to perceive a distinct impression of succession.RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, je soutiens, à l'encontre de plusieurs, que l'empirisme de Hume conçoit le temps comme une impression réelle et distincte de succession, voire, une idée nominale et abstraite. Je montre en premier lieu que Hume définit le temps, non en termes de durée, mais de succession, et que cette notion de durée est fictive. À partir de la description de Hume des fonctions de la mémoire et de l'imagination, je montre en second lieu qu'il est possible d'expliquer comment nous sommes capables d'une impression distincte de succession. (shrink)

If the later Middle Ages may reasonably be considered the high point of Aristotelianism in western Europe, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the high point of the renewal of Hellenistic philosophy. Scepticism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism all make powerful appearances, and indeed debates between the adherents of the modern variations on these schools echo and mirror the debates that took place in the third and second centuries BCE. Not surprisingly, the ancient philosophies (to the extent that they were stable in (...) any case) did not remain unchanged: Stoic natural law, Epicurean atomism, and Pyrrhonist doubt all are employed in new and different ways, and the arguments are often strengthened, or at least changed. Comparison of the old and new versions is often illuminating: to see the Christian Epicureanism of Gassendi can improve one's understanding of the original form; to see how Hume deals with Academic scepticism makes the process of sceptical doubt clearer on both sides. (shrink)

Ian Hacking is one of the most original and influential thinkers alive today. His Taming of Chance (Cambridge UP, 1990) was named to The Modern Library’s list of the 100 most important non-fiction books written in English since 1900. In 2001, he was the first Anglophone ever to be elected to a permanent chair at the Collège de France. Though he started in highly technical fields such as logic, statistical theory and formal philosophy of science, he soon moved on to (...) other domains, eventually making important contributions to the philosophy of language, Wittgenstein scholarship, the philosophical study of mental illness, the history of philosophy and more. This recent collection of Hacking’s work provides further confirmation of both the breadth and depth of his thought. (shrink)

There are at least two ways of writing the history of philosophy: the first and most common among those self−identified as "philosophers" treats philosophers of the past as if they were in live dialogue with the present. Only the text is dissected, studied, and analyzed as the interpreter attempts to reconstruct, examine, and occasionally challenge the arguments under consideration. Practitioners of this first way assume that systematic and seemingly internally coherent styles of thought are most worthy of the name "philosophy." (...) These thinkers believe that the term "philosophy," as Richard Rorty pointed out long ago, has an "honorific" sense: philosophy as such stands above other forms of thought, it is regulative in scope, and it serves as something that examines the conclusions of other, necessarily less rigorous fields. The second way is more explicitly contextualist, seeking to understand what a past thinker may have meant in his own time, what outside factors may have shaped his arguments, and how his thought may be part of broader historical currents that are none the less worthy of being remembered and studied now. Practitioners of this way are more likely to believe that ambiguities or seeming deficiencies of clarity that we find in the work of a past thinker are unlikely to be resolved by hypothetical, propositional reconstruction; rather the ambiguities are apparent to us because we are differently situated, so that the study of history is a more powerful tool in helping us satisfactorily access the work ofa past thinker than rationalistic reconstruction. (Full disclosure: I am an advocate of the second way.) This volume presents studies that fall into both of the two camps, as Jerome.. (shrink)

Language and Learning is the latest volume to emerge from the Symposium Hellenisticum conference series. Like its predecessors, this book's alliterative title is a guide to its contents, which in this case examine a range of issues involving the philosophical treatment of language by Hellenistic philosophers (or, in a couple of cases, those preceding or following them), a topic that has been strangely neglected by specialists. And as with other volumes in the series, Language and Learning features a healthy blend (...) of relatively junior scholars and the most senior scholars in the field, all of whom were given expert guidance by the editors. Given the interest of the topic and the high quality of the contributions, it is a welcome addition to the literature on ancient philosophy. (shrink)

While a handful of scholars have probed the purported link between peace and justice, the notion that a sustainable peace is a just peace has become a mantra amongst many policymakers and civil society activists.1 Whether through formal, ad hoc or traditional means, confronting historical injustices is seen as essential to restoring the rule of law, creating honest and inclusive historical narratives, and enabling the coexistence of hostile groups by taming the desire for vengeance. In particular, reparations programmes are attracting (...) increased interest from researchers and policymakers alike. Under international law, reparation encompasses three main types of remedy: restitution, financial compensation and satisfaction. Restitution aims to restore the conditions that existed prior to a violation, and often involves the return of homes, artefacts or land, while satisfaction addresses non-material injuries and may involve activities such as official apologies, judicial proceedings or truth and reconciliation commissions. Politically, reparations may be understood as the ‘entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices’. (shrink)