This survey was conducted in 2017 to investigate factors influencing social risk perception of biotechnologists and plant breeders in training toward GM food based on a conceptual model. A random sample of 210 biotechnologists and plant breeders in training was studied. Confirmatory factor analysis and the reliability tests have been used to verify the uni-dimensionality of the measurement scale, SEM also was carried out to determine the most parsimonious models with the best fit for social risk perception of GM foods (...) and path analysis was conducted to understand the exogenous variables introduced in the research model. The findings revealed that the engineers in training had moderate social risk perception regarding GM foods. Moreover, the results of structural equation modeling showed the capability of the model in predicting the social risk perceptions of engineers in training. The psychological attributes of risks, social benefit perception, attitude toward using technology, level of religiosity, and moral and ethical beliefs emerged as the most powerful predictors of the social risk perception. The social benefit perception and attitude toward using technology also mediated the effects of psychological attributes of risks, level of religiosity, and moral and ethical beliefs. The social benefit perception also had an indirect influence on the engineers in training’s social risk perception of GM foods. Finally, we recommend the application of the model developed by this study for better understanding of social risk perception of stakeholders to have a more informed view of the development and promotion of GM foods. (shrink)

Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, (...) her attempt to restrict subjectivism primarily to “urgent” situations like self-defense contradicts her own point of departure and is either incoherent or futile. Finally, the only actual whole-heartedly objectivist account she criticizes is an easy target; while those objectivist accounts one finds in certain Western European jurisdictions are immune to her criticisms. Those accounts are also clearly superior to hers in terms of action-guidingness. (shrink)

Water is recognized to pose some very urgent questions in the near future. A significant number of people are deprived of clean drinking water and sanitation services, with an accordingly high percentage of people dying from water borne diseases. At the same time, an increasing percentage of the global population lives in areas that are at risk of flooding, partly exacerbated by climate change. Although it is increasingly recognized that adequate governance of water requires that issues of “equity” or “social (...) justice” are taken into account, political philosophers or applied ethicists have so far not or only barely been involved in the debate on water governance. In this paper, it is argued that political philosophers or applied ethicists should become more involved in the debate on water governance. Their role can be twofold: clarifying the debate; and help analyzing some urgent distributive questions related to water governance. The paper is concluded with an outline for an ethics of water governance. (shrink)