The present paper will argue that, for too long, many nominalists have concentrated their researches on the question of whether one could make sense of applications of mathematics (especially in science) without presupposing the existence of mathematical objects. This was, no doubt, due to the enormous influence of Quine's "Indispensability Argument", which challenged the nominalist to come up with an explanation of how science could be done without referring to, or quantifying over, mathematical objects. I shall admonish nominalists to enlarge (...) the target of their investigations to include the many uses mathematicians make of concepts such as structures and models to advance pure mathematics. I shall illustrate my reasons for admonishing nominalists to strike out in these new directions by using Hartry Field's nominalistic view of mathematics as a model of a philosophy of mathematics that was developed in just the sort of way I argue one should guard against. I shall support my reasons by providing grounds for rejecting both Field's fictionalism and also his deflationist account of mathematical knowledge—doctrines that were formed largely in response to the Indispensability Argument. I shall then give a refutation of Mark Balaguer's argument for his thesis that fictionalism is "the best version of anti-realistic anti-platonism". (shrink)

ABSTRACTA probability model is underdetermined when there is no rational reason to assign a particular infinitesimal value as the probability of single events. Pruss claims that hyperreal probabilities are underdetermined. The claim is based upon external hyperreal-valued measures. We show that internal hyperfinite measures are not underdetermined. The importance of internality stems from the fact that Robinson’s transfer principle only applies to internal entities. We also evaluate the claim that transferless ordered fields may have advantages over hyperreals in probabilistic modeling. (...) We show that probabilities developed over such fields are less expressive than hyperreal probabilities. (shrink)

Cauchy’s contribution to the foundations of analysis is often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean continuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein, a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile Borel, (...) the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as developed by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Björling, an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence. Cauchy’s foundational stance is hereby reconsidered. (shrink)

The widespread idea that infinitesimals were “eliminated” by the “great triumvirate” of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass is refuted by an uninterrupted chain of work on infinitesimal-enriched number systems. The elimination claim is an oversimplification created by triumvirate followers, who tend to view the history of analysis as a pre-ordained march toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian epsilontics. In the present text, we document distortions of the history of analysis stemming from the triumvirate ideology of ontological minimalism, which identified the continuum (...) with a single number system. Such anachronistic distortions characterize the received interpretation of Stevin, Leibniz, d’Alembert, Cauchy, and others. (shrink)

Cauchy's sum theorem is a prototype of what is today a basic result on the convergence of a series of functions in undergraduate analysis. We seek to interpret Cauchy’s proof, and discuss the related epistemological questions involved in comparing distinct interpretive paradigms. Cauchy’s proof is often interpreted in the modern framework of a Weierstrassian paradigm. We analyze Cauchy’s proof closely and show that it finds closer proxies in a different modern framework.

We examine Paul Halmos’ comments on category theory, Dedekind cuts, devil worship, logic, and Robinson’s infinitesimals. Halmos’ scepticism about category theory derives from his philosophical position of naive set-theoretic realism. In the words of an MAA biography, Halmos thought that mathematics is “certainty” and “architecture” yet 20th century logic teaches us is that mathematics is full of uncertainty or more precisely incompleteness. If the term architecture meant to imply that mathematics is one great solid castle, then modern logic tends to (...) teach us the opposite lesson, namely that the castle is floating in midair. Halmos’ realism tends to color his judgment of purely scientific aspects of logic and the way it is practiced and applied. He often expressed distaste for nonstandard models, and made a sustained effort to eliminate first-order logic, the logicians’ concept of interpretation, and the syntactic vs semantic distinction. He felt that these were vague, and sought to replace them all by his polyadic algebra. Halmos claimed that Robinson’s framework is “unnecessary” but Henson and Keisler argue that Robinson’s framework allows one to dig deeper into set-theoretic resources than is common in Archimedean mathematics. This can potentially prove theorems not accessible by standard methods, undermining Halmos’ criticisms. (shrink)

Let ( * X, * T) be the nonstandard extension of a Hausdorff space (X, T). After Wattenberg [6], the monad m(x) of a near-standard point x in * X is defined as m(x) = μ T (st(x)). Consider the relation $R_{\mathrm{ns}} = \{\langle x, y \rangle \mid x, y \in \mathrm{ns} (^\ast X) \text{and} y \in m(x)\}.$ Frank Wattenberg in [6] and [7] investigated the possibilities of extending the domain of R ns to the whole of * X. Wattenberg's (...) extensions of R ns were required to be equivalence relations, among other things. Because the nontrivial ways of constructing such extensions usually produce monadic relations, the said condition practically limits (to completely regular spaces) the class of spaces for which such extensions are possible. Since symmetry and transitivity are not, after all, characteristics of the kind of nearness that is obtained in a general topological space, it may be expected that if these two requirements are relaxed, then a monadic extension of R ns to * X should be possible in any topological space. A study of such extensions of R ns is the purpose of the present paper. We call a binary relation $W \subseteq ^\ast X \times ^\ast X$ an infinitesimal on * X if it is monadic and reflexive on * X. We prove, among other things, that the existence of an infinitesimal on * X that extends R ns is equivalent to the condition that the space (X, T) be regular. (shrink)

We construct an algebra of generalized functions endowed with a canonical embedding of the space of Schwartz distributions.We offer a solution to the problem of multiplication of Schwartz distributions similar to but different from Colombeau’s solution.We show that the set of scalars of our algebra is an algebraically closed field unlike its counterpart in Colombeau theory, which is a ring with zero divisors. We prove a Hahn–Banach extension principle which does not hold in Colombeau theory. We establish a connection between (...) our theory with non-standard analysis and thus answer, although indirectly, a question raised by Colombeau. This article provides a bridge between Colombeau theory of generalized functions and non-standard analysis. (shrink)

This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ①. The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these (...) notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts :539–555, 2017; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49:835–841, 2008; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5:73–75, 2011) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics. (shrink)

In this paper I study how divergent mathematical treatments affect mathematical modelling, with a special focus on utility theory. In particular I examine recent work on the ranking of information states and the discounting of future utilities, in order to show how, by replacing the standard analytical treatment of the models involved with one based on the framework of Nonstandard Analysis, diametrically opposite results are obtained. In both cases, the choice between the standard and nonstandard treatment amounts to a selection (...) of set-theoretical parameters that cannot be made on purely empirical grounds. The analysis of this phenomenon gives rise to a simple logical account of the relativity of impossibility theorems in economic theory, which concludes the paper. (shrink)

Let S be a semigroup, let n∈N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$n\in \mathbb {N}$$\end{document} be a positive natural number, let A,B⊆S\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$A,B\subseteq S$$\end{document}, let U,V∈βS\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {U},\mathcal {V}\in \beta S$$\end{document} and let let F⊆{f:Sn→S}\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}\subseteq \{f:S^{n}\rightarrow S\}$$\end{document}. We say that A is F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal (...) {F}$$\end{document}-finitely embeddable in B if for every finite set F⊆A\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$F\subseteq A$$\end{document} there is a function f∈F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f\in \mathcal {F}$$\end{document} such that fAn⊆B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f\left \subseteq B$$\end{document}, and we say that U\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {U}$$\end{document} is F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finitely embeddable in V\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {V}$$\end{document} if for every set B∈V\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$B\in \mathcal {V}$$\end{document} there is a set A∈U\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$A\in \mathcal {U}$$\end{document} such that A is F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finitely embeddable in B. We show that F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finite embeddabilities can be used to study certain combinatorial properties of sets and ultrafilters related with finite structures. We introduce the notions of set and of ultrafilter maximal for F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finite embeddability, whose existence is proved under very mild assumptions. Different choices of F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document} can be used to characterize many combinatorially interesting sets/ultrafilters as maximal sets/ultrafilters, for example thick sets, AP-rich sets, K¯\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\overline{K}$$\end{document} and so on. The set of maximal ultrafilters for F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finite embeddability can be characterized algebraically in terms of F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}. This property can be used to give an algebraic characterization of certain interesting sets of ultrafilters, such as the ultrafilters whose elements contain, respectively, arbitrarily long arithmetic, geoarithmetic or polynomial progressions. As a consequence of the connection between sets and ultrafilters maximal for F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finite embeddability we are able to prove a general result that entails, for example, that given a finite partition of a set that contains arbitrarily long geoarithmetic progressions, one cell must contain arbitrarily long geoarithmetic progressions. Finally we apply F\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {F}$$\end{document}-finite embeddabilities to study a few properties of homogeneous partition regular diophantine equations. Some of our results are based on connections between ultrafilters and nonstandard models of arithmetic. (shrink)

We explore the potential of Simon Stevin’s numbers, obscured by shifting foundational biases and by 19th century developments in the arithmetisation of analysis.

One of the most influential scientific treatises in Cauchy's era was J.-L. Lagrange's Mécanique Analytique, the second edition of which came out in 1811, when Cauchy was barely out of his teens. Lagrange opens his treatise with an unequivocal endorsement of infinitesimals. Referring to the system of infinitesimal calculus, Lagrange writes:Lorsqu'on a bien conçu l'esprit de ce système, et qu'on s'est convaincu de l'exactitude de ses résultats par la méthode géométrique des premières et dernières raisons, ou par la méthode analytique (...) des fonctions dérivées, on peut employer les infiniment petits comme un instrument sûr et commode pour abréger et simplifier les demonstrations.Lagrange's renewed enthusiasm for .. (shrink)

We analyze the developments in mathematical rigor from the viewpoint of a Burgessian critique of nominalistic reconstructions. We apply such a critique to the reconstruction of infinitesimal analysis accomplished through the efforts of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass; to the reconstruction of Cauchy’s foundational work associated with the work of Boyer and Grabiner; and to Bishop’s constructivist reconstruction of classical analysis. We examine the effects of a nominalist disposition on historiography, teaching, and research.

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals are (...) Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy. (shrink)

This paper outlines a framework that may provide a mathematically rigorous quantum field theory. The framework relies upon the methods of nonstandard analysis. A theory of nonstandard inner product spaces and operators on these spaces is first developed. This theory is then applied to construct nonstandard Fock spaces which extend the standard Fock spaces. Then a rigorous framework for the field operators of quantum field theory is presented. The results are illustrated for the case of Klein-Gordon fields.

Let X be a set, and let $\hat{X} = \bigcup^\infty_{n = 0} X_n$ be the superstructure of X, where X 0 = X and X n + 1 = X n ∪ P(X n ) (P(X) is the power set of X) for n ∈ ω. The set X is called a flat set if and only if $X \neq \varnothing.\varnothing \not\in X.x \cap \hat X = \varnothing$ for each x ∈ X, and $x \cap \hat{y} = \varnothing$ for x.y (...) ∈ X such that x ≠ y, where $\hat{y} = \bigcup^\infty_{n = 0} y_n$ is the superstructure of y. In this article, it is shown that there exists a bijection of any nonempty set onto a flat set. Also, if W̃ is an ultrapower of X̂ (generated by any infinite set I and any nonprincipal ultrafilter on I), it is shown that W̃ is a nonstandard model of X: i.e., the Transfer Principle holds for X̂ and W̃, if X is a flat set. Indeed, it is obvious that W̃ is not a nonstandard model of X when X is an infinite ordinal number. The construction of flat sets only requires the ZF axioms of set theory. Therefore, the assumption that X is a set of individuals (i.e., $x \neq \varnothing$ and a ∈ x does not hold for x ∈ X and for any element a) is not needed for W̃ to be a nonstandard model of X. (shrink)

Cylindric set algebras are algebraizations of certain logical semantics. The topic surveyed here, i.e. probabilities defined on cylindric set algebras, is closely related, on the one hand, to probability logic (to probabilities defined on logical formulas), on the other hand, to measure theory. The set algebras occuring here are associated, in particular, with the semantics of first order logic and with non-standard analysis. The probabilities introduced are partially continous, they are continous with respect to so-called cylindric sums.

SummaryWe present a systematic discussion of the structural and conceptual simplifications of proofs of standard theorems afforded by nonstandard methods and examine to what extent the resulting nonstandard proofs satisfy the informal criterion of “plausibility”. We introduce the concept of a “standard detour” and show that all nonstandard proofs considered avoid such detours. Among the proofs examined are proofs of the Intermediate Value Theorem, the Riemann Integration Theorem, the Spectral Theorem for compact Hermitian operators, and the Arzela‐Ascoli Theorem.RésuméNous discutons systématiquement (...) les simplifications structurelles et conceptuelles apportées par des méthodes non standard aux démonstrations de théorèmes standard et examinons jusQuà quel point de telles démonstrations non standard satisfont à un critère informel de plausibilityé. Nous introduisons la notion de détour standard et montrons que toutes les démonstrations non standard considérées évitent de tels détours. Parmi les démonstrations examinées: celles du théoréme de la valeur intermédiate, du théorème ?on;intégration de Riemann, du théorème spectral pour les opérateurs hermitiques compacts et du théorème ?on;Arzelà‐Arcoli.ZusammenfassungWir stellen eine systematische Betrachtung der durch die Nichtstandard‐Methoden gegebe‐nen strukturellen und begrifflichen Vereinfachungen von Beweisen von Standardsätzen an, und untersuchen, wie weit die entstandenen Nichtstandard‐Beweise das informelle Kriterium der Plausibilität erfüllen. Wir führen den Begriff eines Standard‐Umweges ein, und zeigen, dass alle betrachteten Nichtstandard‐Beweise solche Umwege vermeiden. Unter den betrachteten Beweisen befinden sich Beweise des Zwischenwertsatzes, des Riemannschen lntegralsatzes, des Spektralsatzes für kompakte, hermitische Operatoren, und des Theorems von Arzelà‐Ascoli. (shrink)

Heinz Von Forester characterizes the objects “known” by an autopoietic system as eigen-solutions, that is, as discrete, separable, stable and composable states of the interaction of the system with its environment. Previous articles have presented the FBST, Full Bayesian Significance Test, as a mathematical formalism specifically designed to access the support for sharp statistical hypotheses, and have shown that these hypotheses correspond, from a constructivist perspective, to systemic eigen-solutions in the practice of science. In this article several issues related to (...) the role played by language in the emergence of eigen-solutions are analyzed. The last sections also explore possible connections with the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce. (shrink)