T. Govier's description of ‘conductive argument’ and 'A priori analogy' is taken as a start to investigate non-deductive argumentation. It is here argued, that the nature of those types can be better understood when taking up a dynamic view (in addition to the usual structural view). The concepts of ‘frame’ and ‘position’ are constructed in order to establish such a twofold approach.

The paper consists of three parts. The aim of the first part is to depict the concept of science in the analytic philosophy of science to point out its characteristic defects. The second part shows how the constructive philosophy of science is able to avoid these defects by honouring not special modes of research but speicial modes of foundation of results in research with its criteria for science. The third part finally refutes the main counter-arguments of analytic philosophy of science (...) against the constructive. (shrink)

The theoretical labor carried out over the past half-century in the field of argumentation theory has become so rich, heterogenous, and controversial by now that there is an urgent need for a philosophically reflected foundation. The present book attempts to deliver such a basis using, in particular, elements of dialectics and pragmatism. It approaches argumentation against the background of the conditio humana: as the medium of maintaining and improving orientation for all aspects of life. This perspective is more abstract than (...) the usual way of addressing argument as a specific way of persuasive communication. However, that abstract philosophical perspective allows, on a concrete level, a more realistic theorization of the practice of argument. Thus, it exhibits some significant new traits, mainly concerning its subjective and its dynamic side. (shrink)

The paper provides a series of responses to the papers published in Vol. 37, No. 3, of this journal that explored the ideas in Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of Argument, where arguing is understood as the theoretical or theory-forming activity that can be found in research of all kinds. Thus, the approach taken focuses on the validity of theses. This approach is clarified further as the author considers points raised by his commentators and provides answers and, where necessary, corrections.

The first two sections of this paper jointly comprise an edited version of the commentary I presented in the panel discussion of Harald R. Wohlrapp, The concept of argument: A philosophical foundation at the OSSA 11 conference, May 2016. My principal focus was on a claim Wohlrapp makes about the extent to which his concept of justification is "reconcilable" with the views of current philosophers about justifications. Following the conference, Wohlrapp sent me a response to my commentary. (...) In section 3, I report and reply to three of the comments he made in his response. (shrink)

Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of Argument has made a significant contribution to the argumentation theory by proposing a new approach to our way of thinking about arguments and argumentation that in which he proposes a criterion of criterial validity: An thesis is valid, if there are no open objections against the justification offered for it. In this paper, I will focus on some issues and difficulties with that principle.

When a new theory of argumentation becomes available on the English-speaking market, such as it is happening now through the translation of Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of Argument, it is always interesting to work out how the new input will interact with the work that has otherwise been done in the field. This comment aims to determine whether rhetoric has a place in Wohlrapp’s account of argumentation.

Review of Harald Wohlrapp’s “Der Begriff des Arguments” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s10503-012-9268-5 Authors Michael J. Hoppmann, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X.

I describe and evaluate Harald Wohlrapp’s proposal in The Concept of Argument that we should see reasonable argumentation as guided by the “principle of transsubjectivity... that, beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up for consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other”, and thus as having a quasi-religious meaning.

Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise. I shall concentrate here on aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation, a type of what has been called conductive argument. Though initially intrigued by my efforts to describe and explore conductive argument, Harald Wohlrapp later concluded that my treatments were seriously flawed and that an alternative approach can serve to replace that problematic and much contested conception. Much of the difference between our approaches concerns what (...) he deems to be a logicistic approach on my part. (shrink)

In this special issue, we are fortunate to be able to publish a series of papers on Harald Wohlrapp's The Concept of Argument, preceded by Wohlrapp’s own précis of his book.