A recent debate concerning the representational content of DNA in developmental processes has opposed “dynamicists” and “computationalists.” I review the arguments in favor of a representational interpretation of the role of genes, and show that they are inconclusive. There is a very restricted sense in which genes can be said to represent something, and stronger claims about DNA being a program for the construction of an organism are overstatements. I also show that arbitrariness, taken by representationalists to be a central (...) criterion for identifying representational vehicles, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to qualify as a representation. Finally, I propose a relatively new way to define what programs are, which implies that genetic regulatory networks shouldn’t be thought of as being programs. As a consequence, insofar as cognition and development share similar mechanisms, any computational account of cognition should be significantly weakened. (shrink)

Several psychosocial models have been proposed to explain the etiology of eating disorders and obesity separately despite research suggesting they should be conceptualized within a shared theoretical framework. The objective of the current study was to test an integrated comprehensive model consisting of a host of common risk and protective factors expected to explain both eating and weight disorders simultaneously in a large school-based sample of adolescents. Data were collected from 3,043 youth from 41 schools in the Ottawa region, Canada. (...) Working with interested school staff, validated self-report scales in the form of a questionnaire booklet were administered to participating students to assess several understood risk and protective factors common to both eating disorders and obesity. Anthropometric measurements of weight and height were taken at the end of the questionnaire administration period by trained research staff. Structural equation modeling with cross-validation was used to test the hypothesized model. Findings demonstrated that dysregulated eating was associated with both eating disorder and weight status with diet culture and emotion dysregulation directly associated with some of these disordered eating patterns. It equally pointed to how lifestyle made up of high sedentary behaviors, low vigorous exercise and varied eating patterns contributed to both emotion dysregulation and poor body image which subsequently affected eating issues and weight status simultaneously, signaling the complex interplay of psychosocial factors that underlie these concerns. This study provides evidence for an integrated psychosocial model consisting of socio-environmental, psychological, and behavioral factors may best explain the complex interplay of risk and protective factors influencing eating disorders and obesity. It equally highlights understanding the direct and indirect effects of some of the most salient risk factors involved in eating and weight-related concerns, including the strong effects of diet culture and stressors such as weight-based teasing, providing interventionalists evidence of important risk factors to consider targeting in eating disorder and weight-based prevention efforts. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Applying Radical Constructivism to Machine Learning: A Pilot Study in Assistive Robotics” by Markus Nowak, Claudio Castellini & Carlo Massironi. Upshot: I argue that the authors miss an important distinction between realism and representationalism. Because of this, their diagnosis of the current state of machine learning is valid, but for the wrong reasons. As a consequence, their approach to upper limb prosthetics may not be a step in the right direction.

Cet article propose d'étudier l'organisation de la frappe monétaire dans le Péloponnèse entre le règne d'Hadrien et celui de Septime Sévère. Sur la base de l'examen stylistique des monnaies produites à cette époque, l'auteur tente d'établir que, comme l'avait démontré K. Kraft pour l'Asie Mineure, plusieurs cités s'adressaient alors au même atelier pour réaliser leurs émissions monétaires ; des liaisons de coins de droit entre des monnayages différents sont d'ailleurs attestées. L'étude révèle également l'existence, à l'époque de Septime Sévère, de (...) séries particulières, qualifiées ici de « coordonnées » : il s'agit d'émissions où l'on a manifestement tenté d'uniformiser les types monétaires de nombreux monnayages péloponnésiens. (shrink)

Grassmann n’est pas le premier à créer un nouveau calcul :Möbius, Hamilton, Bellavitis, Cauchy, et bien d’autres l’ont précédé dans cette voie qui témoigne de toute l’importance des mutations subies par l’algèbre et de l’évolution des rapports complexes entretenus entre ce domaine et son « exacte contrepartie » la Géométrie euclidienne : à l’heure où s’élaborent les premières « structures » et les « morphismes », la géométrie euclidienne perd son statut de « critère de vérité » et d’« existence (...) » des entités algébriques, notamment dénoncé par un prétendu « retour à la rigueur ».L’introduction « philosophique », décriée par ses contemporains ne voyant là que « fausse philosophie », ne pouvait être impunément écartée : la « seconde » Ausdehnungslehre de 1862 (A2) — pourtant proposée telle une nouvelle version rédigée conformément au style « souhaité » par son époque — ne conviendra pas plus à ses trop rares lecteurs. Tout lecteur averti reconnaît que A2ne peut être parfaitement entendu sans les nécessaires éclaircissements de A1.Trois points nous paraissent aujourd’hui significatifs :– L’Ausdehnungslehre est une science formelle qui trouve sa place dans le système mathématique de Grassmann. Ce système « améliore » celui déjà classique (notamment connu du père de Grassmann) qui résulte du croisement entre les deux contrastes fluants « continu/discret » et « distinct/égal ».– L’Ausdehnungslehre admet la géométrie comme première « application » remarquable. La géométrie [Geometrie] (ou encore la théorie de l’espace [Raumlehre]) est devenue une science réelle (l’espace préexiste), elle ne peut donc légitimement figurer au sein de la mathématique pure.– Une partie précède la séparation en les quatre branches précédentes de la mathématique pure (ou théorie des formes). La théorie générale des formes présente leurs lois communes, soit cette série de vérités qui, de la même manière se rapportent à toutes les branches des mathématiques et qui ne supposent donc que les concepts généraux d égalité, de diversité, de liaison et de séparation. (shrink)

Grassmann n’est pas le premier à créer un nouveau calcul :Möbius, Hamilton, Bellavitis, Cauchy, et bien d’autres l’ont précédé dans cette voie qui témoigne de toute l’importance des mutations subies par l’algèbre et de l’évolution des rapports complexes entretenus entre ce domaine et son « exacte contrepartie » la Géométrie euclidienne : à l’heure où s’élaborent les premières « structures » et les « morphismes », la géométrie euclidienne perd son statut de « critère de vérité » et d’« existence (...) » des entités algébriques, notamment dénoncé par un prétendu « retour à la rigueur ».L’introduction « philosophique », décriée par ses contemporains ne voyant là que « fausse philosophie », ne pouvait être impunément écartée : la « seconde » Ausdehnungslehre de 1862 (A2) — pourtant proposée telle une nouvelle version rédigée conformément au style « souhaité » par son époque — ne conviendra pas plus à ses trop rares lecteurs. Tout lecteur averti reconnaît que A2ne peut être parfaitement entendu sans les nécessaires éclaircissements de A1.Trois points nous paraissent aujourd’hui significatifs :– L’Ausdehnungslehre est une science formelle qui trouve sa place dans le système mathématique de Grassmann. Ce système « améliore » celui déjà classique (notamment connu du père de Grassmann) qui résulte du croisement entre les deux contrastes fluants « continu/discret » et « distinct/égal ».– L’Ausdehnungslehre admet la géométrie comme première « application » remarquable. La géométrie [Geometrie] (ou encore la théorie de l’espace [Raumlehre]) est devenue une science réelle (l’espace préexiste), elle ne peut donc légitimement figurer au sein de la mathématique pure.– Une partie précède la séparation en les quatre branches précédentes de la mathématique pure (ou théorie des formes). La théorie générale des formes présente leurs lois communes, soit cette série de vérités qui, de la même manière se rapportent à toutes les branches des mathématiques et qui ne supposent donc que les concepts généraux d égalité, de diversité, de liaison et de séparation. (shrink)

It is widely believed that neural elements interact by communicating messages. Neurons, or groups of neurons, are supposed to send packages of data with informational content to other neurons or to the body. Thus, behavior is traditionally taken to consist in the execution of commands or instructions sent by the nervous system. As a consequence, neural elements and their organization are conceived as literally embodying and transmitting representations that other elements must in some way read and conform to. In opposition (...) to this conception, growing approaches such as enactivism and ecological psychology hold that neurons are not in the business of representing. However, by insisting that neural causation is not of a representational kind, these anti-representationalist approaches seem to be left with only one rather implausible alternative, viz. that behavior is the result of nothing but basic physical causation such as push-pull forces. In this paper it is argued that a third form of causation—termed “modulation”—exists and is at work in the coordination of animal behavior. Modulation is the quasi-direct guidance of dynamical systems through specific yet emerging trajectories. By setting the constraints that coordinate the free interaction of multi-element systems, modulation influences without forcing nor representing goal states. The basic properties of modulatory causation are analyzed and shown to be present in some fundamental aspects of neural and bodily interaction. (shrink)

The role of the cerebellum as a comparator of desired motor output and actual performance may be most important during learning of a novel motor task, when movement errors are common and corrective movements are produced to compensate for them. It is suggested that PET and recent fMRI data are compatible with such an interpretation. Increased activity in motor cortical areas during motor learning indicates that these areas also contribute to the learning process, [THACH].

A “ late” (6th or 13th c.) coin hoard discovered at Argos This study is devoted to a monetary hoard uncovered during emergency excavations in Argos in 1998 by the IVth Ephorate of Nafplion. The bulk of this hoard consists of Byzantine coins, along side which are found examples attributed to the Vandals as well as earlier coins, some dating to the Hellenistic period. The presence of a half-follis of Justin II indicates that the hoard was deposited ca 575-580, when (...) Peloponnesus faced several successive Avaro-Slav movements. The possible presence of a 12-13th c. coin of Fauquembergues, which would significantly alter the date and the significance of this deposit, is also discussed. (shrink)

Silence et sagesse montre combien les innombrables expériences et ascèses du silence, à travers la littérature ou les arts aussi bien que la philosophie ou la théologie, ont contribué à la constitution de la culture des hommes et de leur hominisation, au-delà ou en deça du logos et de son primat.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: This commentary highlights some controversial aspects of enactivism and ecological psychology, specifically the notions of subjectivity and ecological information. I argue that, instead of choosing between them, both theories could complement each other at different levels of analysis in a single research framework for explaining cognition from a situated perspective.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Fultot, Nie, and Carello are correct that enactive researchers should be more aware of the research literature on ecological psychology, but their charge of mental construction is off-target. Enactivism and ecological psychology are compatible frameworks with different, complementary, emphases.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In my view, the clash between ecological psychology, enactivism, and constructivism in general has more to do with irreconcilable metaphysical and theoretical incommensurabilities than disagreements about specific mechanisms or processes of perception. Even with mutual enabling of action and perception, some internal process of self-modification is still needed if novel behavior is to be adequately explained.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Enactive approaches highlight the deep interdependency of brains, action, agency, and environment in shaping the world we inhabit. This perspective goes beyond input-output models of cognition, postulating instead closed loops of action and perception framed by the agent-environment complementarity. As a unique, dynamical, system, no representational recovery is required for cognitive-behavioral experience to take place.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The authors of the target article seem on the one hand to want to reprimand enactivists for not embracing ecological psychology, and on the other, to criticise them for taking on board some - but not all - of the principles of ecological psychology. In this commentary, I argue that the claim that enactivists have not embraced ecological psychology (...) is false, and that it is coherent for enactivists to take on only some of the principles of ecological psychology, as the two research frameworks have different overall projects. Furthermore, I argue that there is an enactivism-friendly stream of ecological psychology research that is currently yielding exciting results that both broaden the depth of ecological psychology research and bring it into dialogue with enactivism-inspired approaches to understanding perception and experience. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: I contrast enactivist and ecological perspectives on some of the themes raised by the authors. I discuss some of their worries about the notion of sense-making and other epistemological aspects of enactivism.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We extend the authors’ arguments on direct perception, specificity, and foundational principles to concerns for theories of joint action. We argue for the usefulness of the affordance concept in an ecological theory of social interaction; highlighting linkages between theories of affordance-based behavior and fundamental, physical principles.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In this commentary, I focus on several issues concerning the notion of presentation. I argue that Fultot, Nie and Carello do not pay sufficient attention to these problems, despite the fact that Gibson, compared here with Husserl, may be regarded as one of those thinkers who made an important contribution to this.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We examine whether there are any irreducible contradictions between ecological psychology and radical enactivism. We concentrate on two points of contention between the two approaches: the relevance of neural structures in understanding perception and the use of semantically loaded concepts in theorizing about perception.

In the context of research 2LAPRE 2 we observed sessions of Philosophically Orientated Discussion (POD)provided by the permanent teachers of the ordinary elementary and secondary school classes. In a formation context we are interested in the itinerary of three elementary school’s teachers of three different levels (1st Cycle, 2nd Cycle and 3rd Cycle). By the observation of actual practices at three moments during the scholar year, what can we spot of the POD norm’s construction? The analysis of the linguistic exchanges, (...) will identify what is played out for the teacher from its organizer’s point of view (beliefs, conceptions, values and what they judge as important). We will proceed with a systematic analysis: - of the communication networks through Flament’s theoretical framework (1965) to approach the linguistic productions distribution on the participants and the animation from that results; - and Geneva’s model (Roulet et al., 1985) where the communications are constructs that articulate components of different levels to study them in their structure-functional dimension. The analysis will permit to chart the variability of the activity for each of these three teachers, or not, around the conception of what is the POD. We will use the results already published in the article Saint-Dizier, Specogna, Luxembourger (2016) that we look at from the point of view of the question we want to deal with this article whether: POD norm, variability, invariability of the activity. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to complement some of the main points defended in the target article. In particular, I want to explore further the central role of agent-level explanations and of evolution for our understanding of a meaningful environment. I finish by wondering whether an excessive focus on ontological questions could be problematic for a proper defence (...) of ecological psychology. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The main goal of this commentary is to make more discriminative the comparison between enactive and ecological theories of perception. Emergence at the level of the animal-environment system might be playing the role attributed to mental construction in basic perceptual processes. If correct, this would render some forms of enactivism compatible with the theoretical tenets of the target article.