This article, drawing on philosophical sources, proposes a certain way of seeing the nature and scope of values education: as a matter of ‘sustaining the ethical environment’. The idea is introduced that just as we live in a physical environment we also live in an ethical environment, ‘the surrounding climate of ideas about how to live’. It is argued that there are some illuminating analogies between our responsibility for the quality of the physical environment and our responsibility for the quality (...) of the ethical environment. Values education, in turn, can be seen as an important way in which we can collectively attend to the quality of the ethical environment; in doing so, we should put positive value on diversity within that environment. This way of seeing values education suggests a way in which teachers can realistically see their own responsibilities for values education. (shrink)

This book offers a critical and thought-provoking analysis of some of the fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of education. It includes ideas such as the demands of pluralism and the liberal fear of indoctrination.

This article examines the work of R. S. Peters on moral development and moral education, as represented in his papers collected under that name, pointing out that these writings have been relatively neglected. It approaches these writings through the lens of the ‘familiar story’ that philosophical work on this topic switched during, roughly, the 1980s from an emphasis on rational principles to an emphasis on virtues and care. Starting from what Peters called ‘the paradox of moral education’—roughly, that a rational (...) morality must be developed in part through habit—the article discusses not only Peters' rational morality of principles and rules but also elements of his thought concerning virtues and care. Running through the discussion is the question of whether Peters, in drawing for instance on Aristotle as well as Kohlberg, is attempting to combine incompatible ideas. Against this, it is suggested that in reading Peters now we can learn from his explicit claim that we need a pluralistic, not a monolithic, approach to moral development and moral education. (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Should teachers have their own professional ethics?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 30, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 301–306, https://.

Graham Haydon; Should teachers have their own professional ethics?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 30, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 301–306, https://.

Graham Haydon; The Utility of Wringe's Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 113–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

Graham Haydon; The Utility of Wringe's Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 113–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

What are values? Where do our values come from? How do our values make a difference to education? For educational leaders to achieve distinction in their practice, it is vital to establish their own clear sense of values rather than reacting to the implicit values of others. This engaging book guides readers in thinking for themselves about the values they bring to their task and the values they intend to promote. Crucially, the book promotes critical thought and constructive analysis about (...) the underlying values involved with: - aims and moral purpose in education - individual qualities in educational leadership - vision in education - school ethos and culture - the school as an educational community. By inviting reflection using valuable case studies and work-through activities, as well as referring to a wide range of academic literature, this book will be an important resource for those working towards professional qualifications such as NPQH, and invaluable for anyone aspiring to excellence in educational leadership. Graham Haydon is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy of Education at the Institute of Education, University of London, where he teaches on Masters courses in Values in Education and Applied Educational Leadership and Management. (shrink)

I have suggested that popular demands for moral education, and beliefs that it can be effective, for instance in reducing violence, presuppose some appropriate and shared conception of morality and moral education. But the existence, and even the possibility, of such a shared conception is often now called into question. The focus is very often on diversity within a plural society. And I have myself argued before that not only do we have differences of opinion over whether certain sorts of (...) conduct are morally right or wrong, we also have different conceptions of what it means to call something morally right or wrong, and even disagreement over whether such terminology has any useful role at all. (cf. Haydon, 1995; 1999c; 1997 Chapter 6; White, 1990, Chapter 3; Williams, 1985, Chapter 10.). (shrink)

Whatever may be the case for philosophy in general, philosophy of education has had rather little to say about violence. The Journal of Philosophy of Education, for instance, from its conception in the 1960s under the title of Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, has contained very little discussion of violence. There have been occasional papers in which violence is referred to, from discussions of the justification of punishment in schools, which include corporal punishment within their (...) remit, to discussions of peace education. But the idea of violence itself has hardly been a focus at all. (shrink)

Of all the objections to construing morality(n) in terms of rules, those which turn on the nature of moral reasoning, judgement and perception are perhaps the most directly pertinent to education, since they raise the question of whether people can be taught to think morally. The terms ‘reasoning, judgement and perception’ cover a wide field (deliberately); below I shall sometimes use the term ‘moral thought’ as a general term which does not prejudge questions such as how explicit the thinking has (...) to be, or whether there has to be some thinking which precedes action. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Peters' Paradox of Moral Education The Neglect of Peters on Moral Education Peters the Rationalist Peters the Virtue Theorist Is it Paradoxical to Combine Aristotle and Kohlberg? Is it Paradoxical to Combine Virtues with Rules? Peters and Care Ethics Conclusion: Peters the Pluralist Notes References.

Whatever may be the case for philosophy in general, philosophy of education has had rather little to say about violence. The Journal of Philosophy of Education, for instance, from its conception in the 1960s under the title of Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, has contained very little discussion of violence. There have been occasional papers in which violence is referred to, from discussions of the justification of punishment in schools, which include corporal punishment within their (...) remit, to discussions of peace education. But the idea of violence itself has hardly been a focus at all. (shrink)

Whatever may be the case for philosophy in general, philosophy of education has had rather little to say about violence. The Journal of Philosophy of Education, for instance, from its conception in the 1960s under the title of Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, has contained very little discussion of violence. There have been occasional papers in which violence is referred to, from discussions of the justification of punishment in schools, which include corporal punishment within their (...) remit, to discussions of peace education. But the idea of violence itself has hardly been a focus at all. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

If the reader expects, under this chapter's title, a list of norms which are to constitute the content of a publicly shared morality(n), then he or she will have missed the point of much of my argument in the last several chapters. Such a content is not something to be laid down by a philosopher: it is to be arrived at through consensus and criticism in the light of a shared understanding of morality(n).

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

If there is to be a convergence in public understanding on a minimal conception of morality, morality(n), there has to be a way of talking about the content of that morality which can be both readily understood and widely adopted.

If there is to be a convergence in public understanding on a minimal conception of morality, morality(n), there has to be a way of talking about the content of that morality which can be both readily understood and widely adopted.

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

As I stressed in Chapter 13, I have by no means addressed all aspects of moral education in this book, let alone all aspects of personal and social education or of a school's concern for spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. Even within the notion of `moral development' there is much about which I have said little. In Chapter 3 I sketched a rather crude notion of moral development by which it could be said that someone has developed morally to (...) the extent that he or she has come to share the values which are central to a given society. That way of conceiving of moral development leaves out a great deal: it says nothing about individual attitudes and feelings towards others or about the degree of responsibility the individual takes for his or her own behaviour. Nor does it tell us what balance is to be struck in the overall educational task between putting across received norms, trying to develop virtues, and encouraging the capacity for and disposition towards autonomous thought. I do not, therefore, put it forward as a conception of moral development tout court. Nevertheless, it does point to an aspect of moral development in which society has a legitimate interest, but which education has not in recent years done much systematically to address. It is my contention that this is an important aspect of moral development for education to take into account, not least because it can at the same time be seen as an aspect of education for citizenship. (shrink)

As I stressed in Chapter 13, I have by no means addressed all aspects of moral education in this book, let alone all aspects of personal and social education or of a school's concern for spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. Even within the notion of `moral development' there is much about which I have said little. In Chapter 3 I sketched a rather crude notion of moral development by which it could be said that someone has developed morally to (...) the extent that he or she has come to share the values which are central to a given society. That way of conceiving of moral development leaves out a great deal: it says nothing about individual attitudes and feelings towards others or about the degree of responsibility the individual takes for his or her own behaviour. Nor does it tell us what balance is to be struck in the overall educational task between putting across received norms, trying to develop virtues, and encouraging the capacity for and disposition towards autonomous thought. I do not, therefore, put it forward as a conception of moral development tout court. Nevertheless, it does point to an aspect of moral development in which society has a legitimate interest, but which education has not in recent years done much systematically to address. It is my contention that this is an important aspect of moral development for education to take into account, not least because it can at the same time be seen as an aspect of education for citizenship. (shrink)

As I stressed in Chapter 13, I have by no means addressed all aspects of moral education in this book, let alone all aspects of personal and social education or of a school's concern for spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. Even within the notion of `moral development' there is much about which I have said little. In Chapter 3 I sketched a rather crude notion of moral development by which it could be said that someone has developed morally to (...) the extent that he or she has come to share the values which are central to a given society. That way of conceiving of moral development leaves out a great deal: it says nothing about individual attitudes and feelings towards others or about the degree of responsibility the individual takes for his or her own behaviour. Nor does it tell us what balance is to be struck in the overall educational task between putting across received norms, trying to develop virtues, and encouraging the capacity for and disposition towards autonomous thought. I do not, therefore, put it forward as a conception of moral development tout court. Nevertheless, it does point to an aspect of moral development in which society has a legitimate interest, but which education has not in recent years done much systematically to address. It is my contention that this is an important aspect of moral development for education to take into account, not least because it can at the same time be seen as an aspect of education for citizenship. (shrink)

The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971, p. 51): It is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their conduct on certain moral matters.… However, if it is to (...) be admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. (shrink)

The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971, p. 51): It is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their conduct on certain moral matters.… However, if it is to (...) be admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. (shrink)

The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971, p. 51): It is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their conduct on certain moral matters.… However, if it is to (...) be admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. (shrink)

Next time some more-than-usually striking act of violence hits the headlines, consider the opinions expressed in the media. Will you find a reference to education? Quite possibly, if the violence has not involved schools or young people, you will not. But if children or young people who have only recently left school are involved as perpetrators, it will be surprising if you do not encounter the view that there must be something amiss in education; that if young people were getting (...) a proper moral education, events like these would never happen. This kind of view was expressed, for instance, after the murder of two-year old James Bulger by two ten-year old boys, after the murder of the headteacher Philip Lawrence, and after the shooting of children in a school in Jonesboro, Arkansas, by two classmates. (shrink)

I have given some reasons for doubting whether a language of virtues can do the job which a publicly shared understanding of morality, in modern conditions, requires. It might be, however, that there is a particular role for the language of virtues where violence is the focus; in this chapter I shall consider that possibility. In the philosophical literature on moral education there seems to be little to draw on in this respect. That may be because writers using a language (...) of virtues are interested in some thicker notion of flourishing rather than in establishing preconditions for a minimally good life; but the same point also illustrates the way in which some of the philosophical literature about moral education has become rather detached from certain public concerns. (shrink)

Next time some more-than-usually striking act of violence hits the headlines, consider the opinions expressed in the media. Will you find a reference to education? Quite possibly, if the violence has not involved schools or young people, you will not. But if children or young people who have only recently left school are involved as perpetrators, it will be surprising if you do not encounter the view that there must be something amiss in education; that if young people were getting (...) a proper moral education, events like these would never happen. This kind of view was expressed, for instance, after the murder of two-year old James Bulger by two ten-year old boys, after the murder of the headteacher Philip Lawrence, and after the shooting of children in a school in Jonesboro, Arkansas, by two classmates. (shrink)

I have given some reasons for doubting whether a language of virtues can do the job which a publicly shared understanding of morality, in modern conditions, requires. It might be, however, that there is a particular role for the language of virtues where violence is the focus; in this chapter I shall consider that possibility. In the philosophical literature on moral education there seems to be little to draw on in this respect. That may be because writers using a language (...) of virtues are interested in some thicker notion of flourishing rather than in establishing preconditions for a minimally good life; but the same point also illustrates the way in which some of the philosophical literature about moral education has become rather detached from certain public concerns. (shrink)

The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971, p. 51): It is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their conduct on certain moral matters.… However, if it is to (...) be admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. (shrink)

The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971, p. 51): It is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their conduct on certain moral matters.… However, if it is to (...) be admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. (shrink)

A democratic society requires a degree of consensus on values. But it is argued that the model of values education as the transmission of certain predetermined values is inadequate in a democracy, since for several reasons the transmission of predetermined values can itself be undemocratic. Education for individual autonomy in matters of values is also, by itself, inadequate. Each generation needs the resources by which it can work out its own interpretation of democratic values. What is also needed, then, is (...) an education in a common language of discourse — which can be drawn primarily from philosophy — which will facilitate public debate. (shrink)

Whatever may be the case for philosophy in general, philosophy of education has had rather little to say about violence. The Journal of Philosophy of Education, for instance, from its conception in the 1960s under the title of Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, has contained very little discussion of violence. There have been occasional papers in which violence is referred to, from discussions of the justification of punishment in schools, which include corporal punishment within their (...) remit, to discussions of peace education. But the idea of violence itself has hardly been a focus at all. (shrink)

We have as yet seen no reason to think that the language of virtues can replace a language of norms for purposes of public moral discourse (though the one may exist alongside and interact with the other). The language of norms is likely to have a certain priority for the articulation of morality(n), particularly if the role of morality(n) is seen as analogous to the role of law. If the analogy is extended to cover not only the role of morality(n) (...) but its form, then morality(n) will be seen as a system of norms, as law often is. (shrink)

I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change which exist for the law. The reader could reasonably demand that I say at least something more than I have said so far about ways in which the processes of consensus, criticism and change I have in mind (...) could be given some sort of institutional basis. Without that, the kind of understanding of morality that I have been speaking of is likely to remain no more than an understanding which some members of society — perhaps some of those who are both somewhat reflective and somewhat pragmatic — are likely to have. And then it will not be a shared public understanding at all. (shrink)

Education has been important in the thinking of philosophers from the beginning of the Western tradition. But only in the middle of the twentieth century was philosophy of education recognised in Britain as a distinct discipline, with the establishment of a professorial chair at the Institute of Education, University of London, in 1947. Fifty years later a series of public lectures, jointly sponsored by the Institute and the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, marked the Anniversary. After the founding (...) contribution of Louis Arnaud Reid, it was in the 1960s that Richard Peters and his colleague Paul Hirst set an analytical direction for philosophy of education. Here, from the standpoint of the rather different view he takes of education now, Hirst gives his own account of that development. David E. Cooper examines the influence on educational thinking of the wider philosophical and cultural climate of the time. Susan Mendus takes a political philosopher's view of the challenges facing moral education in an age of pluralism. And at a time when the value of educational research is under scrutiny, David Bridges argues that one of the weaknesses of much research is its neglect of philosophical thinking. The contributors share a sense of philosophy's capacity to contribute to the improvement of educational practice through the broader perspective that it brings to that practice. (shrink)

I have suggested that popular demands for moral education, and beliefs that it can be effective, for instance in reducing violence, presuppose some appropriate and shared conception of morality and moral education. But the existence, and even the possibility, of such a shared conception is often now called into question. The focus is very often on diversity within a plural society. And I have myself argued before that not only do we have differences of opinion over whether certain sorts of (...) conduct are morally right or wrong, we also have different conceptions of what it means to call something morally right or wrong, and even disagreement over whether such terminology has any useful role at all. (cf. Haydon, 1995; 1999c; 1997 Chapter 6; White, 1990, Chapter 3; Williams, 1985, Chapter 10.). (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Autonomy as an Aim of Education and the Autonomy of Teachers, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 219–228.