The origins and development of the problem of mental causation are outlined. The underlying presuppositions which give rise to the problem are identified. Possible strategies for solving, or dissolving the problem are examined.

The first sections of the paper deal with the notion of a dialogue and some basic dialogic modalities. The critical or rational modality is highlighted as typical of philosophical argumentation. The following sections deal with a widespread phenomenon in current philosophical controversies: to charge the dialogic counterpart with the commission of a philosophical fallacy. The Naturalistic Fallacy is taken as the most famous example of that sort of strategy. Its structure and aims are analized, and it is concluded that, leaving (...) aside other sorts of critical points, the accusation violates the canons of the rational dialogue. (shrink)

Me propongo elucidar los sentidos que algunos filósofos de la mente dan a la expresión «naturalismo» cuando se autocalifican de naturalistas. Mi atención no está dirigida a los programas de naturalización, sino a la adopción de «metafilosofías» naturalistas. Después de describir la posición de los filósofos canónicos de la mente, de explicar qué entiendo por «canon tradicional» y de caracterizar el naturalismo, paso revista a textos de Block, Fodor, Dennett, Wittgenstein y Cummins que, entiendo, exponen distintas maneras de ser naturalista (...) en la filosofía de la mente. En y intento formular un balance y fijar mi posición. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to inquire about the possibility and conditions of an interface between the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Psychology. After arguing that interfacing is a problem for Naturalistic-minded philosophers , Goldman´s tripartite classification of interface tasks, is analysed and exemplified. The final sections of the paper are devoted to the controversy concerning the role images and imaginistic thinking play in a standard cognitive theory. The idea is to apply Goldman´s tasks to some of the pertinent (...) philosophical contributions. Finally, what is really at stake in the controversy is described, alternatively, as an intratheoretic discussion affecting the cognitivist program or a clash between different ways of practicing experimental psychology or and obvious sympton of a crises affecting the theoretical relevance of the notion of representation. (shrink)

This paper is intended as a set of notes on the philosophical use of metaphors, similes, analogies, and the like (Part I), the analysis of Neurath-Quine’s famous nautical metaphor (Part II), and a discussion of Quine’s views concerning the revisability of beliefs, common sense convictions, and the Continuity Thesis (Part III).